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THE POVERTY of sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most obdurate features 
of the world economy.  Since the industrial revolution,  this has been the 
world's  poorest  and also  its  most  slowly  growing  region.  The  most 
reliable estimates of world and regional gross domestic products for the 
period  1820-1992  are those  prepared by Angus  Maddison.1  Figure  1 
shows  estimated  long-term  growth  profiles  for  selected  regions.  Ac- 
cording to these estimates,  sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter, Africa) began 
the modern era at approximately  one-third of  the income  level  of  the 
richest  region  at that time,  Western  Europe.  In  1992  it had approxi- 
mately one-twentieth  of the income level  of the richest region,  Maddi- 
son's  "western  offshoots,"  which includes the United States,  Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Maddison estimates that Africa's  per cap- 
ita income in 1992 was approximately that of Western Europe in 1820: 
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$1,284  in Africa compared with $1,292  in Europe, in purchasing power 
parity (PPP)  1990 international dollars.2 Although  this is only  a gross 
approximation,  it highlights  the extent of Africa's  economic  plight. 
Africa's  poor  economic  growth  has been  chronic  rather than epi- 
sodic.  Maddison examines  five major subperiods for Africa:  1820-70 
(the precolonial era); 1870-1913  (the onset of colonial  rule up to World 
War I); 1914-50  (the world wars and the Great Depression);  1950-73 
(late  colonial  rule and early  independence);  and 1973-92  (the recent 
period).  As shown in table 1, he estimates that Africa had slow  growth 
during each of these subperiods. Many observers today point to Africa's 
growth during  1950-73  and its subsequent  slowdown  as an argument 
that postindependence  governments  severely  undermined the potential 
for rapid economic  growth. It is apparent from the table, however,  that 
even  in this most successful  subperiod Africa's  growth lagged  behind 
that of the rest of the world.  From a quite different perspective,  many 
observers in the early 1960s,  at the start of Africa's  independence  from 
colonial  rule, argued that Africa's  long period of slow growth (relative 
to the rest of the world) would end once the colonial yoke was removed. 
This manifestly  did not happen. African per capita income growth av- 
eraged  1.5  percent in the  1960s,  0.8  percent in the  1970s,  and  -1.2 
percent in  1980s.  Output per capita continued to decline  from 1990 to 
1996  at a rate of 0.9  percent per year.3 Africa's  overall  slow  growth 
has continued  despite  intensive  reform efforts  during the past decade. 
This record of growth is perhaps the greatest disappointment and sur- 
prise of recent African history. 
Over  the  period  1985-96,  per  capita  economic  growth  averaged 
-0.6  percent per year (weighted  by population); twenty-one  countries 
out of the forty-two  for which data are available experienced  negative 
per capita economic  growth. There were a few notable success  stories. 
2.  Maddison's  data show that Africa's per capita income increased  by a factor of 
almost 2.5 between 1820 and 1992. Although  not negligible, this figure  is small com- 
pared  with those for other  regions  of the world. For example, over the same period  per 
capita  income increased  by factors  of 14.9, 7.4, and  5.9 among  Western  countries,  Latin 
America, and Asia, respectively. Likewise, per capita  income in Africa was 68 percent 
of the world  average  in 1820, but  only 24 percent  by 1992. Relative  to per  capita  income 
in Western  Europe, income in Africa  declined from 35 to 7 percent  over this period. 
3.  The income  growth  figures  are  population-weighted  averages  of purchasing  power 
parity  (PPP)-adjusted  per capita income data. Through  the 1980s, they are drawn  from 
the Penn World  Tables, version 5.6. Data for the 1990s are from World  Bank (1998). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey D. Sachs  209 
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Equatorial Guinea  and formerly  war-torn Mozambique  lead  the  way 
with growth rates averaging 8.4 and 5.5 percent per year, respectively.4 
Traditionally fast-growing Mauritius and Botswana achieved per capita 
growth of  more than 4  percent per year,  while  Uganda,  a recent re- 
former, grew at a rate of 3.3  percent per year. Ghana, a reformer since 
the early 1980s,  grew at a rate of  1.5 percent. In fact,  in 1995 average 
African  per capita growth  achieved  a recent  high  of  1.7  percent per 
year,  apparently the result of policy  reforms in preceding  years com- 
bined with widespread good  weather conditions.  In 1996 it was about 
4.  From 1992 to 1995, Equatorial  Guinea  grew at a rate  of 21 percent  per annum  on 
the basis of significant  discoveries  and  development  of offshore  oil. 210  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
Table 1. Economic Growth by Region, 1820-92a 
Percent  (annual  rates) 
Period anid  West  Western  South  East  Latin  World 
size  Europe  offshoots  Europe  Europe  America  Asia  Africa  total 
1820-69  1.0  1.4  0.6  0.7  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.6 
1870-1912  1.3  1.8  1.1  1.0  1.5  0.6  0.4  1.3 
1913-49  0.9  1.6  0.4  1.2  1.5  0.1  1.0  0.9 
1950-72  3.9  2.4  4.9  3.5  2.5  3.8  2.1  2.9 
1973-92  1.8  1.4  1.7  -  1.1  0.5  3.2  -0.1  1.2 
1820-92  1.5  1.7  1.4  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.6  1.2 
Number  of 
countries  12  4  5  7  7  11  10  56 
Source: Maddison (1995,  table 3-1). 
a. Growth is measured in GDP per capita. For definition of regions, see appendix G in Maddison. 
the same,  at  1.6  percent per year,  but it then declined  to 0.8  percent 
per year in 1997.  A recent forecast by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)  puts  growth  for  1998  at  1. 1  percent.5 And  despite  the  recent 
growth, per capita income in 1997 was approximately 2.9 percent below 
its  1991 level. 
The World Bank places  Africa's  1996 per capita GDP at $1,259  in 
1987 PPP-adjusted prices (5.9  percent of the U.S.  level).  Fifteen of the 
world's poorest twenty countries are in Africa. Moreover, our estimates 
indicate that in 1990,  47 percent of Africa's  population lived  in abject 
poverty,  that is,  with income of less than $1 per day. Finally,  in terms 
of the United Nations  Development  Programme's human development 
index,  which takes into account life expectancy  and literacy as well  as 
per capita GDP,  thirty-two of the forty countries that rank lowest,  and 
nineteen  of the bottom twenty,  are in sub-Saharan Africa.6 
In recent debate,  six sets of factors have frequently been invoked to 
account for Africa's  poor economic  performance: 
-external  conditions:  the legacy  of  centuries  of  slave  trading and 
colonial  rule, as well  as the manipulation of African politics  during the 
cold war; 
-heavy  dependence  on  a small  number of  primary exports,  with 
declines  and volatility  in terms of trade; 
5.  Evangelos A.  Calamitsis, "Africa's Recent Economic Performance  and Chal- 
lenges and the Role of the IMF," 1998, p. 2; available  on the worldwide  web page of 
the IMF. 
6.  United Nations Development  Programme  (1997). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  211 
-internal  politics:  characterized  by  authoritarianism,  corruption, 
and political  instability; 
-economic  policies:  protectionism,  statism,  and fiscal profligacy; 
-demographic  change: in particular, rapid population growth; and 
-social  conditions:  deep ethnic divisions,  indicated by high levels 
of  ethnolinguistic  and religious  diversity  and low  levels  of  "social 
capital. " 
Although  there is some evidence  in support of each of these expla- 
nations,  we believe  that they miss  an even bigger truth. At the root of 
Africa's  poverty  lies  its  extraordinarily  disadvantageous  geography, 
which has helped to shape its societies  and its interactions with the rest 
of  the world.  Sub-Saharan Africa  is by far the most tropical-in  the 
simple  sense  of  the highest  proportions of land and population  in the 
tropics-of  the world's  major regions,  and tropical regions  in general 
lag far behind temperate regions in economic  development.  Moreover, 
in  several  dimensions  its  environment  is  without  parallel  in  raising 
obstacles  to growth. As consequences  of its climate,  soils,  topography, 
and disease  ecology,  Africa  suffers  from chronically  low  agricultural 
productivity  (especially  food  production),  high  disease  burdens,  and 
very low  levels  of  international trade, which  is concentrated in a few 
primary commodities. 
The  region's  economic  performance  is  further impeded  by  its  de- 
mographic circumstances,  which  are themselves  most likely  related to 
Africa's  poor  geographic  and economic  conditions.  Africa  has  the 
world's highest youth dependency  ratios, a consequence  of the combi- 
nation of the world's  highest  fertility  rates and falling  levels  of infant 
and child mortality. High youth dependency ratios impose a substantial 
drag on  African economies  by  reducing their productive capacity per 
capita. Low life expectancies and extremely youth-heavy age distributions 
also tend to be associated with lower rates of saving and investment (as 
conventionally measured), and therefore slower economic  growth.  The 
youthful structure  of Africa's population pyramid and the sluggishness of 
its transition to lower fertility rates indicate that African economies  will 
be burdened by rapid population growth for several decades. 
A few  countries in the tropics have made significant  breakthroughs 
in economic  growth in the past twenty-five  years,  in almost  all cases 
through the promotion of manufacturing or service sector exports. Their 
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diffuse  across climatic  zones  much more readily than technologies  in 
agriculture. It is probably no coincidence  that the greatest tropical suc- 
cess  stories-Hong  Kong and Singapore-are  small island economies 
with negligible  agricultural sectors and rapid growth in manufacturing 
and service  sector exports.7 With the sole  exception  of Mauritius,  no 
African  country has made a similar transition to export-led  growth in 
manufactures or services.  This  is partly the result of  Africa's  greater 
inherent difficulties,  but also due to the fact that neither African gov- 
ernments nor the IMF or the World Bank have promoted the kinds of 
institution needed for such a transition; the ultimate irony of the "struc- 
tural adjustment programs"  of  the Bretton Woods  institutions  is that 
they  promoted  virtually  no  structural change.  After  twenty  years  of 
reform, Africa remains the exporter of a narrow range of primary com- 
modities (for example,  oil,  diamonds, copper, gold,  coffee,  tea, cocoa, 
palm oil,  and rubber), most of which  are suffering  long-term declines 
in international terms of trade. 
Much too little  is known  about the effects  of climate,  topography, 
and natural ecology  on public  health,  nutrition,  demographics,  tech- 
nological  diffusion,  international trade, and other determinants of eco- 
nomic development to make definitive claims.  Therefore at many points 
below  we  present  informed  speculation.  One  goal  of  the paper is  to 
stress  the  need  for  intensified  research  on  the complex  issues  at the 
intersection  of ecology  and human society. 
Our paper could well be misunderstood.  Some will regard it as a new 
case  of  "geographic  determinism"  arguing that Africa  is  fated to be 
poor because of its geography.  Some will regard it as a distraction from 
the important truth that, geographic  difficulties  or no,  African govern- 
ments have seriously  mismanaged economic  policy  in the past genera- 
tion.  Let us therefore be clear at the outset.  We believe  emphatically 
that economic  policy  matters, and our formal econometric  results show 
that to be true.8 We nonetheless  focus  on geography for three reasons. 
First,  there  is  little  to  be  gained  from  yet  another recitation  of  the 
damage  caused  by  statism,  protectionism,  and corruption to  African 
7.  We point out below that these economies are also blessed by the fact that as 
islands, they are better able to control vector-borne  tropical  diseases such as malaria, 
which has been eradicated  in both. 
8.  We also make this point in recent related studies; see, in particular,  Sachs and 
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economic  performance. Second,  most economists  are woefully  neglect- 
ful of the role of forces  of nature in shaping economic  performance in 
general,  and in  Africa  in  particular.  They  treat economies  as  blank 
slates  onto which  another region's  technologies  and economic  history 
may be grafted. A healthy counterexample  is the recent study of world 
economic  history by David  Landes,  which  in its very first chapter as- 
signs geography an extremely  prominent role as a determinant of long- 
term  performance  .9 
Third,  and perhaps most important, good  policies  must be tailored 
to  geographical  realities.  If  agricultural  productivity  is  very  low  in 
Africa for climatological  reasons,  perhaps the real lesson is that growth 
should  be  led  much more by outward-oriented  industry and services, 
rather than blindly making yet another attempt to transplant "integrated 
rural development"  strategies  from  other parts of  the  world  without 
customizing  them to Africa's  unique conditions.  At the very least,  the 
intensification  of scientific  research on tropical agriculture in Africa- 
along  the lines  of  that underpinning the  "green  revolution"  in South 
and East Asia-is  warranted, since current technologies  are insufficient 
for dramatic improvements  in agriculture. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we discuss the 
general problems of tropical development  and put Africa's  problems in 
worldwide tropical perspective.  We then discuss demographic trends in 
Africa,  emphasizing  the low  levels  of population  density  and urbani- 
zation  and the  delayed  demographic  transition  compared  with  other 
developing  regions.  In the  following  section  we  use  standard cross- 
country  growth  equations,  augmented  with  demographic  and  geo- 
graphic variables,  to account  for the relative  roles  of  geography,  de- 
mography,  and policy  in Africa's  recent growth experience.  We then 
consider  future growth  strategies,  and especially  the urgent need  for 
urban-based export growth in manufacturing and services.  Finally,  we 
summarize our conclusions  and discuss  an agenda for future research. 
Geography and Economic Development in Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa  is  the tropical  region par  excellence,  with  93 
percent of  its  land area lying  between  the Tropic  of  Cancer and the 
9.  Landes  (1998). 214  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998 
Tropic of Capricorn. At the root of Africa's  long-term growth crisis  is 
Africa's  extraordinary geography.  As Fernand Braudel writes: "In un- 
derstanding Black  Africa,  geography  is more important than history. 
The  geographical  context  is  not  all  that matters,  but  it  is  the  most 
significant." 10 Thomas Sowell  also emphasizes  geography,  especially 
its role in making cultural interaction more difficult both between Africa 
and the rest of the world and within Africa. II 
An Overview of Tropical versus Temperate Development 
In all parts of  the world,  economic  development  in tropical  zones 
lags  far behind  that in temperate  zones.  In  1995  tropical  economies 
averaged $3,326  in GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted),  while the nontrop- 
ical  countries  averaged  $9,027.12  In a world ranking of  countries  by 
GDP per capita, only two of the top thirty lie in the tropics: Hong Kong 
and Singapore.'3  These  are also  the only  two  tropical economies  that 
the World  Bank  currently classifies  as high-income  economies.  And 
what is true across countries is also true within countries that straddle 
the tropics and temperate zones,  such as Australia and Brazil: the tem- 
perate regions  within these countries are much more highly  developed 
than tropical regions.14 
10. Braudel  (1995, p. 120). 
11. Sowell (1998) quotes Braudel  approvingly  in his excellent chapter  on Africa. 
For extremely  comprehensive  and illuminating  treatments  of long-term  linkages among 
geography, health, and economic development, see Diamond (1997); Landes (1998); 
Reader  (1998). In addition,  see Hall and  Jones (1997) for recent  empirical  evidence that 
a country's  distance  from the equator  is strongly  positively associated  with income per 
capita. 
12.  Since many countries  straddle  the tropics, for purposes  of discussion we define 
a tropical  country  as one in which half or more  of the land area  lies between  the Tropics 
of Cancer  and Capricorn.  The GDP per capita  calculations  are based on the universe  of 
countries with populations  of  1 million or more, a total of  150 countries covering 
approximately  99 percent  of the world's population.  There  are  seventy-two  such  tropical 
countries,  of which forty-one  are  in Africa-including all sub-Saharan  African  countries 
except South Africa and Lesotho. The tropical  countries  have a combined 1995 popu- 
lation of  2.3  billion, or 41  percent of the total in our universe of countries. Their 
combined  land area  is 45 million kM2, out of a total of 129 million km2  in our universe, 
or 35 percent. 
13. World  Bank (1998). These data are PPP-adjusted,  expressed  in current  interna- 
tional dollars. 
14. On Brazil, see Gallup, Llussa, and Sachs (1998). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey D. Sachs  215 
Within the African continent,  the small temperate zones  at the north 
and south have significantly  higher incomes  than the tropical core. The 
five North African countries  have  an average  1995  income  of  $4,371 
(PPP-adjusted),  compared with tropical sub-Saharan Africa's  average 
of $1,732,  and nontropical South Africa's  $7,348.  The average of four 
southern countries-South  Africa  and Lesotho  in the temperate zone 
and Botswana  and Namibia,  which  straddle the  tropics-is  $5,438. 
According  to the World Bank,  the three fastest  growing  countries  in 
sub-Saharan Africa during 1985-95  were Botswana,  Mozambique,  and 
Namibia,  all of which  straddle the tropical and temperate zones  at the 
southern end of the continent.  15 
Productivity growth in the tropics has lagged far behind productivity 
growth in the midlatitudes  since  the middle of the nineteenth century, 
and all  evidence  suggests  that the  temperate  zone  continues  to be 
the  dynamic  center  of  innovation  in  the  world  economy.  Well  over 
90 percent of global  R&D expenditure  and at least that percentage  of 
patents  worldwide  originate  in  the  northern midlatitude  economies. 
Such differences  in productivity growth and innovation probably reflect 
the interplay of four related factors. First, many kinds of technologies- 
for  example,  in  agriculture  and construction-do  not  transfer  well 
across  ecological  zones.  Second,  the temperate zones  have  long  had 
much higher rates of endogenous  technical change than the tropics. One 
reason for this might be the simple  fact that the northern hemisphere 
midlatitudes have had much larger populations than the tropics through- 
out  history  (at  least  since  1500),  and  so  have  offered  much  larger 
markets for innovation.  Since innovation has crucial increasing returns 
to scale  properties,  this advantage would  tend to cumulate over time. 
Third, the tropics seem to pose  several inherent difficulties,  especially 
in agriculture and public health.  Fourth, the tropics are disadvantaged 
simply because they are far from the large midlatitude markets; many 
firms choose  to locate  near larger markets in order to lower  transport 
costs from suppliers and to final customers.  Problems of transport costs 
are especially  acute for African countries, both within the continent and 
between  it and the rest of  the world.  Distance  alone  is  not the main 
explanation  of  the  shortfall  in  tropical  development,  however.  The 
15.  World Bank (1997b,  table  1, p. 214). 216  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
southern hemisphere  temperate zone  economies  are even  farther from 
the main world markets than are the tropics, but are considerably richer 
in per capita terms. The problem seems  to lie with the tropics itself. 
Figure 2 shows  the world allocation  of population,  land area, popu- 
lation  density,  aggregate  GDP,  and GDP  per capita,  by  10? latitude 
bands (thus the tropical region  is closely  but not exactly  captured by 
the bands from latitudes 20? N to 20? S). 16  To make the allocations  of 
GDP  by  latitude band,  we  maintain the counterfactual  simplification 
that per capita incomes  are uniform within countries,  so that the geo- 
graphic  allocation  of  GDP  within  a country  that extends  across  one 
latitude  band  is  allocated  solely  according  to  the  distribution  of  its 
population across bands. This procedure no doubt overstates  the share 
of income  in the tropics,  since,  as noted above,  the per capita income 
gradient within countries favors temperate zone regions compared with 
tropical regions. 
The  first important point  from  figure 2  is  that the  bulk of  human 
population  (62  percent) and almost half of the land mass (45 percent) 
are between latitudes 20? N and 50? N.  Indeed,  almost three-fourths of 
the human population  (73  percent) resides  in the great Eurasian land 
mass  and closely  associated  islands,  of  which  only  a very  small  part 
(8  percent  of  the  land  and  14 percent  of  the  population)  lies  in  the 
geographical tropics. The northern hemisphere midlatitudes are not only 
the most populated region but also the most densely  populated.  Popu- 
lation densities  fall off  in the high latitudes (above  50? N),  as well  as 
in the tropics and the southern hemisphere nontropics.  We believe  that 
this differential population density reflects, at a deep level,  three forces. 
First,  as a basic  biological  condition,  the photosynthetic  potential  for 
food  production  is  probably  highest  in the  midlatitudes.  This  would 
give  advantage in achieving  high population densities  to both northern 
and southern hemisphere  midlatitudes  relative  to  the tropics  and the 
high latitudes.  Second,  long-term endogenous  technical change,  which 
has been inherently favored by the large populations  in the temperate 
regions  (interacting  with  scale  effects  in innovation),  has  further 
16.  Between  the tropical latitudes 23.45?  N and 23.45?  S,  the population  stands at 
1.2 billion,  or 21 percent of the world population of 5.7  billion.  The tropical land area 
is 45  million  kM2,  or 35 percent of a world habitable land area of  129 million  km2. The 
average  tropical  population  density  is  39.1  persons  per kM2,  compared  with  the non- 
tropical population density  of 45.2  persons per km2. David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  217 
Figure 2. World  Allocation  of Geographic,  Demographic,  and Economic  Variables  by 
Latitude, 1995 
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boosted  the population-carrying  capacities  of the midlatitudes.  Third, 
the southern hemisphere  mid- and high latitudes have very little land, 
and therefore offer a very small local market compared with the north- 
ern hemisphere.  Even  if  technologies  in the  temperate  northern and 
southern hemispheres  are fully  transferable, enterprises will  choose  to 
locate  in the northern hemisphere rather than the southern hemisphere 
in order to benefit from the proximity to markets. 
Figure  2  also  shows  the  remarkable U-shaped  distribution  of  per 
capita GDP by latitude band. The northern and southern mid- and high 
latitudes are rich compared with the tropical zone.  This panel strongly 
suggests  that technologies  readily  diffuse  between  the  northern and 
southern temperate regions,  so that Argentina,  Australia,  Chile,  New 
Zealand,  and South Africa benefit from the technological  advances of 
the northern temperate zone,  as well  as sharing some  intrinsic advan- 
tages relative to the tropics.  The small southern markets do not support 
large populations  or large population  densities,  because  of their great 
distance  from the main world markets,  but they  do  support high  per 
capita living  standards. In figure 3 we  show  GDP per capita by ten- 
degree latitude bands for three sub-regions:  the Americas,  Africa,  and 
Eurasia  and Oceania.  In  each  case,  the  U-shaped  pattern is  plainly 
evident. 
The  combination  of  large  land area,  high  population  density,  and 
high per capita income  leads to a remarkable concentration of overall 
world  GDP  in the  northern  mid-  and high  latitudes.  No  less  than 
69 percent of world GDP,  on a PPP basis,  falls  within latitudes 20? N 
and 600  N.  Only  12 percent of world GDP lies  within latitudes 20? N 
and 20  S.  17 
The Tropical Environment and Agricultural  Productivity 
As  stated above,  the income  lag in the tropics reflects three forces: 
endogenous  technical  change  biased  toward the large temperate zone 
markets, inherent difficulties  of the diffusion  of technology  across eco- 
logical  zones,  and inherent liabilities  of the tropics in agriculture and 
17.  The figure of 69 percent is based on an equal allocation of GDP per capita within 
countries.  If in fact per capita  income  is higher in temperate than in tropical zones  in 
countries  that straddle both regions,  the share of  GDP  in the northern temperate band 
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Figure 3. GDP Per Capita by Latitude,  Selected Regions, 1995a 
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health.  In this  section  we  discuss  the  problems  of  agriculture: why 
agricultural technologies  do not easily  diffuse  from temperate zones to 
the tropics  and why  the tropics  are inherently  disadvantaged  in food 
production.  And we examine  the special  case of Africa in this regard. 
In the following  section,  we present a comparable discussion  of health 
issues. 
Although the tropics include a wide array of climatic  and ecological 
zones,  there are several important common features. First, temperatures 
at sea level  are uniformly high throughout the year; the major temper- 
ature gradients are related to altitude-a  decline of approximately O.4?C 
to 0.5?C  for each  100 m of  height-and  land mass-higher  tempera- 
tures in the interior of continents,  lower temperatures where moderated 
by  the  sea  or monsoon  rainfall.  Second,  insolation  is  generally  high 
year round, except  where it is limited by cloud cover,  as it tends to be 
over the equator. Third,  there is no freezing  except  at very high alti- 
tudes,  such as in the tropical Andes  region,  or the highest  mountains 
of East Africa.  Fourth, day and night are approximately equal in length 
throughout the year. At the equator, all days are twelve hours in length, 
not including  diffuse  sunlight at dusk and dawn. At the tropical boun- 
daries, the shortest day (on the winter solstice)  is approximately eleven 
hours,  and the longest  day (on the summer solstice)  is approximately 
thirteen hours. 
Within these common parameters, tropical climates vary greatly due 
to latitude,  altitude,  ocean currents, the size  and configuration of land 
masses,  location  within  continents  (east coast  climates,  for example, 
are markedly different from west coast climates),  relation to mountain 
ranges,  and so  forth.  Our analysis  of  the effect  of  climatic  variation 
within tropical Africa is based heavily  on the Koppen-Geiger  classifi- 
cation system,  as reported by Tom McKnight. 18 Around the equator in 
Africa,  as in most of the tropics around the world, lies a zone of intense 
year-round  rainfall  and high  temperature,  which  produces  the  great 
equatorial rain forests of West Africa, the Amazon Basin, and Southeast 
Asia.  In Africa,  this band is concentrated within latitudes 5? S to 5? N, 
but in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone)  it also exists  around 100 
N. In the latitude bands of approximately 5? to 200 both north and south 
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of the equator, the climate  is generally characterized by a wet summer 
season  and dry winter season.  Such alternating seasons  with high tem- 
peratures around the year produce the vast savannas (grasslands)  that 
cover roughly 60 percent of the African continent.  Within these bands, 
the farther from the equator, the longer is the dry season.  Closer to the 
equator,  the climate  supports grassy  woodlands;  the far edges  of  the 
bands  are extremely  dry and support only  open  grassland,  as  in the 
Sahel region just  south of the Sahara desert.  Beyond  200  latitude,  the 
arid zone  tends toward desert.  In the northern hemisphere  in Africa, 
such deserts include the Sahara and parts of the Horn of Africa.  In the 
southern hemisphere,  they include the Namib and the Kalihari. 
Much  of  East  and southern Africa  rests on  a high  plateau  at least 
1,000  m above sea level,  with a range of much higher mountains.  The 
high  plateau  mitigates  the  intense  heat  of  the  tropics  and generally 
receives  more  precipitation  than land at sea  level.  In part this  is  an 
orographic  effect,  in  which  the  mountains  cause  moist  tropical  air 
brought from the Indian Ocean by easterly trade winds to rise, resulting 
in condensation.  Thus while  coastal  East Africa  is extremely  hot and 
generally  arid, the eastern highlands  are cooler  and much wetter.  The 
results are profound: most of the populations  of East Africa live  up in 
the highlands  and therefore far from the sea.  What is gained  in agri- 
culture is sorely lost in transport costs! 
The climate in tropical Africa differs from other parts of the tropical 
world  for  several  key  reasons.  First,  because  Africa  is  a large  land 
mass,  vast interior parts of the continent become  extremely  hot, as the 
temperature is not moderated by proximity to the sea.  By contrast,  in 
the island economies  of  Southeast  Asia,  temperatures at similar  lati- 
tudes and altitude are tempered.  Second,  Africa  does  not receive  the 
great monsoon  rainfalls  that provide  vital  seasonal  precipitation  to 
South and East Asia.  A lesser  monsoon  phenomenon  occurs in part of 
West  Africa,  centered  on Nigeria,  but there is  no equivalent  in East 
Africa. Thus in general in Africa,  either it rains all year round, as near 
the equator, or seasonal rainfalls are much less than in South and East 
Asia.  Higher precipitation occurs in the East African highlands,  due to 
orographic effects. 
As a result of lower rainfall and higher mean temperatures, much of 
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evapotranspiration) is highly unfavorable-much  less favorable than in 
many  other  tropical  regions.19 Much  of  Africa  suffers  from  serious 
aridity and a constant  risk of  drought.  Further increasing  the risk of 
drought, rainfall variability  (measured as absolute average percentage 
departure from  the  mean)  is  much  higher  in  Africa  than in  tropical 
America  or Asia.20 World Bank drought indicators show  that twenty- 
nine African countries experienced  at least one year of drought during 
1983-95.  These countries include 50.9  percent of the African popula- 
tion.  Twenty-four  countries  (with 46.7  percent of the population)  ex- 
perienced  at least  two  years of  drought,  and fourteen countries  (with 
28 percent of the population)  experienced  three or more years.2' 
Tropical climates pose serious difficulties  for agricultural productiv- 
ity,  especially  for many food  staples.  As Jen-Hu Chang argues,  "the 
rational choices  are fewer and less  appealing in the humid tropics than 
in most other climatic  regions  of the world.' '22  In addition to obvious 
factors such as temperature and rainfall, Chang cites  several biological 
phenomena  that distinguish  plant growth in the tropics and temperate 
zones.  First,  plants  often  use  the length  of  sunlight  as a stimulus  to 
flower (photoperiodism).  Since  there is little variation in the length of 
the day in the tropics,  many temperate zone plant species  would not be 
induced to flower,  whereas several tropical species  have adapted to the 
twelve-hour  sunlight  in  the  growing  season,  as  "short-day"  plants. 
Second,  many plants require a period of cold temperatures in order to 
flower and develop (vernalization).  Third, many plants require variation 
in insolation (or radiation variation) to develop properly. A fourth prob- 
lem,  specific  to the humid tropics,  is the lack of  a dry season,  since 
many  plants  can  only  bloom  during  the  dry  period  of  the  growing 
season.  The  key  economic  plant species  endemic  to the tropics-for 
19. The soil-water  balance compares  the rate of precipitation,  which makes water 
available  for photosynthesis,  with  the losses of water  due to evaporation  and  transpiration 
(which are combined  in the term  evapotranspiration).  Potential  evapotranspiration  mea- 
sures the rates of evaporation  and transpiration  that would take place if there were an 
abundant  supply of water and a complete  cover of vegetation.  Thus in a barren  desert, 
for example, actual evapotranspiration  may be essentially zero (since there is neither 
precipitation  nor transpiration),  but potential evapotranspiration  could be very high, 
since the high temperatures  would promote  rapid  evaporation  and transpiration  in the 
presence  of ample  precipitation  and vegetation  cover. 
20.  Strahler  and Strahler  (1991, fig. 10.24, p. 187). 
21.  World  Bank (1997a, p. 241). 
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example,  sweet  potato,  yam,  taro,  coconut,  oil  palm,  cocoa,  coffee, 
tea, groundnut, cassava,  nutmeg, banana, mango, papaya-are  specif- 
ically  adapted to these  conditions.  But these  four factors deeply  con- 
strain the variety of plant crops that can grow in the tropics. 
In addition to factors that limit the variety of plant crops,  there are 
also basic biological  factors that limit agricultural yields  in warm trop- 
ical zones.  Crop yields  depend on net photosynthesis,  that is,  the gen- 
eration of energy net of the energy that the plant uses to stay alive and 
to develop.  Plant consumption  of energy,  or respiration,  is dependent 
on temperature, with higher respiration in warmer conditions.  In areas 
where temperatures remain very high at night,  losses  of net photosyn- 
thetic potential are particularly high: what is gained by sunlight during 
the day is lost at a rapid rate at night, so that net photosynthetic potential 
in the warm tropics is reduced.  Chang notes that "other factors being 
equal, an increase of 20 to 30  C of mean annual temperature, particularly 
night temperature, can spell  the difference  between  profit and loss  in 
the operation of tropical plantations."23 
As  temperature (especially  night time  temperature) is  such  an im- 
portant regulator  of  net  photosynthetic  potential,  many  of  the  most 
fertile areas of the tropics are at relatively  high altitudes,  for example, 
the highlands of East Africa and the Andes,  the mountainous spine of 
Central America,  and the  Himalayan  foothills.  These  environments 
generally enjoy not only lower night time temperatures, but also greater 
precipitation (due to orographic rainfall),  and often volcanic  soils  rich 
in nutrients. But in these  cases,  the increased productivity  comes  at a 
high price: the economic  isolation  of populous  communities  from re- 
gional  and international  trade due  to  heavy  transport costs  from  the 
mountain regions.  It is  the irony  of  tropical  highlands  that the most 
densely populated countries in Africa are Rwanda and Burundi-with 
244 persons per km2 and 259 persons per kM2, respectively-which  lie 
in the interlacustrine highlands  of  the Great Lakes  region.  Although 
they are blessed  with  plentiful  rainfall  and subtropical temperatures, 
they  suffer  profound  economic  isolation,  which  contributes  to  their 
ranking among the world's  ten poorest countries. 
The tropics face another problem in addition to high temperature. It 
is usually  supposed that usable  sunlight during the growing  season  is 
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much greater in the tropics than in the midlatitudes and that photosyn- 
thetic potential is therefore greater. However,  while in the tropics there 
are around twelve  hours of sunlight per day throughout the year, in the 
midlatitudes during the interval between the vernal and autumnal equi- 
noxes  there are considerably  more than twelve  hours of  sunlight  per 
day (and there are much fewer than twelve hours in the interval between 
the autumnal and vernal equinoxes).  At 400  latitude,  for example,  the 
summer solstice  has fifteen hours of  sunlight.  Thus for crops that are 
grown once or twice a year, in a four to eight month period, the amount 
of  available  sunlight  in the  annual crop cycle  will  actually  be  much 
higher  in the midlatitudes  than in the tropics.  This  conclusion  holds 
even after accounting for variation in the angle at which sunlight strikes 
the earth at different latitudes and times of year. By contrast, the extent 
of tropical sunlight is greater for crops that can grow year round (such 
as bananas and oil  palm)  and in regions  such as eastern Java,  where 
precipitation  patterns  and  water  control  allow  for  multiple  crops 
throughout the year, rather than tying crops to the rainy season. 
If one combines  the effects  of sunlight and night time respiration,  it 
appears that the intrinsic advantages of the temperate zones  in photo- 
synthetic potential for crops with a four- to eight-month growing season 
can be  very  large.  Phillip  Porter concludes:  "The  net effect  of  these 
latitudinal differences  is that crops that can be grown in a four- to six- 
month period (e.g.,  maize,  wheat, sorghum, soybeans,  and cotton) will 
have higher yields  [in the mid-latitudes]  than their counterparts grown 
in the tropics."24 For both cereals  and root crops,  yields  in the tropics 
are much lower than in the temperate zones  and are especially  low  in 
Africa. 
Cotton  provides  an instructive  example,  since  it is  grown  in both 
temperate and tropical climates,  and the European colonial  powers at- 
tempted to develop  profitable cotton production in tropical Africa.  In 
almost all cases,  the African plantations produced disappointingly  low 
yields.  Figure 4 suggests  that such low yields  are an intrinsic feature of 
the lower photosynthetic potential of the low-altitude tropics relative to 
the temperate zones  and the highland tropics of Peru, where night time 
respiration is considerably reduced by cooler temperatures. The issue of 
intrinsic geographical  differences  in agricultural productivity  remains 
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Figure 4. Effect of Potential  Photosynthesis  on Cotton Yields,  Selected Countriesa 
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poorly studied and a matter of continuing debate, but it is surely one that 
agricultural  economists should turn to with more focus and effort. 
Agricultural productivity  is affected  by more than temperature and 
sunlight,  however.  Water,  soil,  and pests  also  have profound impor- 
tance.  The question of water is complicated,  since  what counts  is the 
soil-water balance, that is, precipitation net of potential evapotranspir- 
ation. Because of the very high temperatures in the tropics,  evapotran- 
spiration is very high,  and usable water is often  scarce,  even  in areas 
of relatively high rainfall. Much of tropical Africa is therefore vulner- 
able to arid or semi-arid conditions;  the exceptions  are those  parts of 
West and Central Africa that receive  equatorial rainfall,  those parts of 
West Africa that receive monsoon rainfall, and parts of the East African 
highlands.  Moreover,  since  rainfall  outside  of  the narrow equatorial 226  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
rain forest  band is  highly  variable,  much  of  Africa  is  vulnerable  to 
drought. There is also evidence  of a long-term decline  in rainfall in the 
Sahel,  which  may  be  linked  to  anthropogenic  climate  change,  both 
local,  possibly  resulting  from  deforestation  and overgrazing,  and 
global,  resulting from greenhouse  gas emissions. 
Moreover,  only  4.0  percent  of  crop  lands  in Africa  are irrigated, 
compared with  11. 1 percent in Latin America,  35. 1 percent in South 
Asia,  and 51.8  percent in China.25 This is arguably due to problematic 
soils,  topography,  and lack of suitable water supplies.  It is one of the 
most interesting and important practical questions for Africa's  agricul- 
tural future whether  significantly  more  land could  be  brought under 
cost-effective  irrigation.  If the current lack of irrigation is a matter of 
social  custom,  land-use  patterns,  public  goods  provision,  and appro- 
priate technologies,  then much more land could  perhaps be irrigated, 
with important effects  on productivity.  If, instead,  the limited agricul- 
ture reflects intrinsic weaknesses  due to the manifold factors mentioned 
above,  any  improvements  in  productivity  are likely  to  be  seriously 
hindered by the continued dependence  on rain-fed agriculture. 
Soil quality is multidimensional-related  to texture, capacity to hold 
water,  nutrient  content,  and other  factors-and  also  crop  specific. 
Moreover,  the qualities  of soil can be highly  variable within a narrow 
geographical  range. In some parts of the tropics, volcanic  soils provide 
a rich nutrient base,  so that high population  densities  are often found 
in well-watered  volcanic  zones,  such as Java, the islands  of the Phil- 
ippines,  parts of the central Mexican Valley,  and parts of the highlands 
of East Africa.  In much of Africa,  however,  soils  are very poor. Much 
of the land is heavily  weathered,  with a large concentration of oxisols 
in Central Africa.26 
Soil  problems  are greatly compounded  in rain forest environments, 
since torrential rains leach the soils  of nutrients. As a result,  the great 
bulk  of  nutrients in rain forest  ecosystems  are actually  found  above 
ground, in the plant growth, rather than in the soils.  The soils maintain 
25.  World  Bank (1998, table 3.2). 
26.  Oxisols are "very old, highly weathered  soils of low latitudes, with an oxic 
horizon  and  low CEC  [cation-exchange  capacity]. .  .  . The level of plant  nutrients  under 
natural  conditions  are so low that  the yields obtainable  under  hand  tillage are very low, 
especially after  a garden  patch  has been used for a year or two. Substantial  use of lime, 
fertilizers, and other  industrial  inputs  is necessary  for high yields and sustained  produc- 
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their fertility  only  by the rapid decomposition  of dead plant material, 
which is then quickly recycled into new plant growth. When rain forests 
are cleared for agriculture, the nutrient cycle  is broken and the soils are 
quickly depleted,  which is why shifting (swidden) cultivation has char- 
acterized traditional agricultural systems  in rain forest ecozones. 
The disease  environment  is another complicating  factor of tropical 
agriculture. As we discuss  with regard to human disease,  many veteri- 
nary disease vectors are concentrated in the tropics, since cold weather, 
and especially  freezing  temperatures,  are barriers to the reproduction 
and survival of both vectors and microbes. Thus much of African wood- 
lands,  the zone between  the equatorial rain forest and the arid savanna 
both north and south of the equator, was effectively  off limits to cattle 
raising until very recently  because  of trypanosomiasis  (cattle sleeping 
sickness),  transmitted by the tropical tsetse  fly.  Likewise,  plant pests 
are prolific.  Insect  pests,  such as locusts,  are far more destructive  in 
the tropical environment than in the midlatitudes,  and massive  rodent 
populations  cause widespread crop damage. 
To  summarize,  tropical  agriculture,  especially  food  production,  is 
faced  with  chronic  problems  of  low  yields  and fragility  due  to  low 
photosynthetic  potential,  high  evapotranspiration,  low  and variable 
rainfall, highly  weathered soils,  veterinary diseases,  and plant and an- 
imal  pests.  In Africa,  these  problems  are particularly  severe.  Large 
parts of  equatorial West  Africa  are rain forest  zones,  with  very high 
temperatures,  fragile  soils,  extreme  precipitation,  and therefore  ex- 
treme limits  in food  potential.  These  regions  specialize  in cash crops 
adapted  to the humid tropical environment and tend to be net importers of 
foodstuffs.  Outside of the equatorial zone,  a large part of the continent 
lies in semi-arid or arid zones, which are problematic for food production 
because of  insufficient water and the ever-present risk of  drought. The 
moderately watered woodland areas also suffer from serious pests,  poor 
soils, and high temperatures.  Much of the relatively successful agriculture 
takes place in the East African highlands, but as a result, local populations 
are isolated from internal and international  trade. 
Infectious Disease  and Economic Development  in Africa 
Tropical populations have lower life expectancies  at birth than those 
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for per capita  income  levels.  In our cross-country  growth  equations 
reported below,  we  show  that low  life  expectancy  at birth is  highly 
predictive of slow economic  growth, after controlling for initial income 
levels,  economic  policy,  and  a  set  of  demographic  and  geographic 
variables.  The unweighted  average life  expectancy  at birth of all non- 
African tropical countries in 1992 was 66.3  years, compared with 49.8 
years  in tropical  Africa.  In nontropical  countries,  the  corresponding 
figure was 70.4  years. 
In a simple regression  (not reported here) of life  expectancy  on per 
capita income  and mean ambient temperature, as a measure of tropical 
conditions,  we  find that hotter climates  display  systematically  lower 
life expectancies.  The point estimate suggests  a loss of 2.3  years of life 
expectancy  at birth for each  10?C increase in average annual tempera- 
ture. We do not attribute this to the direct effects  of heat on body stress, 
since the best evidence  shows that populations can become  well  accli- 
matized  to  a very  wide  range of  ambient temperatures and that even 
hard physical  work effort  is not generally  impeded  by high  tempera- 
tures, except  under extreme conditions.27 Rather, we believe  that high 
temperatures mainly  affect  nutrition and disease  ecology,  which  indi- 
rectly affect human morbidity and mortality. One key linkage is through 
endemic  vector-borne  infectious  diseases.  The evidence  suggests  that 
the burden of  infectious  disease  is vastly  higher in the tropics than in 
the temperate zones,  both as a percentage  of  total disease  burden,  as 
measured by total disability-adjusted  life years (DALYs),  and in abso- 
lute DALYs  per capita.28 
Health conditions  in Africa are very poor in comparison with the rest 
of  the tropics.29 With a life  expectancy  of  53.8  years in  1995,  Africa 
27.  Heat is debilitating  when the body's heat load cannot  be relieved by sweating, 
that is,  when ambient  temperatures  are around  or above body temperature  and when 
humidity  is very high. In these circumstances,  heat  stress  can occur  rapidly  in association 
with heavy physical labor. 
28.  The burden  of disease refers  to DALYs lost due to disease or injury.  It aims to 
combine  morbidity  and mortality  into a single summary  measure  of disease burden.  See 
Murray  and Lopez (1996). 
29.  For example, using 1965 data for a sample of 107 countries,  the regression  of 
log life expectancy  at birth  (LEB)  on log income  per  capita  (LY),  percent  of the country's 
land  area  located within  the tropics  (TR), and  an Africa  dummy  (AF), yields the follow- 
ing result: LEB  =  3.2  +  0.12  LY  -  0.06  TR  -  0.18  AF  (R2 =  0.75),  in which  all 
coefficients  have  p values of less than  0. 1. These results, which are closely comparable David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  229 
has the poorest  regional  health  status in the world.  The  nature of  its 
disease  burden is  significantly  different  from that faced  by  other re- 
gions: 42.5  percent of lost DALYs  in sub-Saharan Africa are caused by 
infectious and parasitic diseases,  as compared with 28.9 percent in India 
(the next highest percentage),  and 2.8  percent in the market economies 
30  of Europe. 
It is not fully known why Africa has been extraordinarily vulnerable 
to  so  many  infectious  diseases.  To  understand the  linkages  between 
geography  and disease,  epidemiologists  need to unravel an enormous 
number of channels of potential interaction.  Climate may affect health 
through nutrition, disease  vectors,  human behavior,  prevalence of par- 
asites,  exposure  to natural disasters,  and so on.  There are also signifi- 
cant feedback mechanisms  between factors,  for example,  nutrition and 
vulnerability  to a specific  infectious  disease.  Since  so little  is known 
about many of these interactions in the tropical setting,  and the quality 
of  data on  causes  of  death and morbidity  are very  poor for  most  of 
Africa,  we are not in a position  to describe the disease  ecology  of the 
African tropics  in any detail.  We illustrate the core issues  by looking 
at two  infectious  diseases  of  profound  consequence  for  Africa,  the 
traditional killer malaria, and the new epidemic killer HIV/AIDS.  Les- 
sons from vector-borne diseases  such as malaria no doubt shed light on 
other endemic  infectious  diseases  such as yellow  fever (transmitted by 
the mosquito  Aedes  aegypti),  leishmanaisis  (transmitted by  the  sand 
fly),  trypanosomiasis  (transmitted by  the  tsetse  fly),  schistosomiasis 
(transmitted by snails),  and various helminth (worm) infestations,  such 
as onchocerciasis  (river blindness),  roundworm, and hookworm.31 
MALARIA.  Malaria is widely  recognized  as one  of  the most  serious 
health  problems  faced  by  the  region.  It is  estimated  that between 
to those based  on 1995 data, indicate  that income-adjusted  life expectancy  is relatively 
low in Africa, even by tropical  standards. 
30.  The African  percentage  is from  Murray  and Lopez (1996, p. 261). 
31.  On the mathematical  biology of vector-borne  infectious disease in general, see 
Anderson  and May (1991), especially chapter  14. On the public health  perspective  on 
tropical  disease, see various essays in Jamison  and others (1993). On the biology of 
hookworm,  see Peter  J. Hotez  and  David  I. Pritchard,  "Hookworm  Infection," Scientific 
American,  vol. 272, no. 6, pp. 68-74 (1995). They estimate  that  one in five of the world 
population  suffers  from  hookworm,  with a heavy concentration  in the tropics, since the 
worm  larvae  need a warm  and moist environment  to survive and grow before infecting 
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1 million  and 2 million  Africans  die from malaria each year,  out of a 
continentwide  total  of  roughly  9  million  deaths per year.  Malaria is 
caused by a protozoan parasite, which is transmitted among humans by 
means of a mosquito host, or vector. Of the four species of Plasmodium 
parasite that cause  malaria-P.falciparum,  P.malariae,  P.ovale,  and 
P.vivax-the  first is  by  far the most  deadly.  The  vectors  of  malaria 
include about a hundred different species of the genus Anopheles.  When 
an infected  vector bites a susceptible  human, it may transmit the para- 
site.  If an uninfected vector bites an infected person, it may imbibe the 
parasite.  In the latter case,  it may then transmit the disease  to a new 
human host.  The most important vector species  in Africa are An. gam- 
biae in the rainy season and An.funestus  in the dry season.  Where they 
coexist,  this pair of  vector  mosquitoes  may sustain transmission  per- 
ennially. 
Individuals  who  contract and survive  repeated episodes  of  malaria 
gradually  acquire partial immunity.  In highly  endemic  communities, 
therefore, children tend to experience far more morbidity and mortality 
than do adults.  Acquired immunity is relatively  short-lived,  however, 
if an individual leaves  the malarial environment.32 There is no vaccine 
or effective  long-term  medical  prophylaxis.  Treatments exist,  but fail 
to reach a large proportion of affected individuals because of problems 
of cost,  availability,  and education.  Besides,  the rapid spread of drug 
resistance is reducing the effectiveness  of many medications,  including 
chloroquine,  mefloquine,  and fansidar. Certain preventative  methods, 
such  as the use  of  insecticides  and bed nets treated with  insecticide, 
have  had some  success,  but insecticide  resistance  tends to grow over 
time. 
The epidemiology  of malaria is extremely complex,  since it involves 
interaction among human, mosquito,  and parasite. The disease ecology 
of  malaria depends  not only  on the density  of Anopheles  mosquitoes 
relative to the human population,  but also on mosquito longevity  rela- 
tive to the life cycle  of the parasite within the mosquito.  Once ingested 
by a vector mosquito,  the parasites transform over a period of eight to 
twelve  days  into the sporozoite  stage,  which  can subsequently  infect 
other  humans.  If  the  mosquito  dies  before  this  incubation  period  is 
32.  Oaks and others  (1991). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  231 
completed,  it never becomes  infective,  even though it carries the par- 
asite.  For our purposes,  the crucial biological  fact is that this extrinsic 
incubation period is regulated by temperature. In the case of falciparum 
malaria, the transformation is likely  to occur only  if the ambient tem- 
perature is  above  22?C; for  vivax  malaria,  above  18?C.33 Thus  the 
transmission  of malaria tends to be stable in hot climates,  unstable in 
warm but not hot climates,  and absent in cool climates,  such as in most 
temperate zones  and above the 2,000m  level  in most of the tropics.  In 
Africa, malaria tends to be stably transmitted both because An.gambiae 
and Anfunestus  are long-lived  and human-specific  and because  the 
climate  favors the development  of falciparum malaria. A stably trans- 
mitted pathogen perpetuates readily, even in the face of energetic public 
health interventions. 
This ecological  point is consistent with evidence  on reductions in the 
prevalence  of  malaria since  World War II.  In  1946,  the range of  the 
disease extended to many subtropical regions,  including southern Spain 
and Italy,  the Levant,  and Central Asia.  During the 1950s  and 1960s, 
the U.S.  government  and the World Health Organization spearheaded 
a global eradication campaign, which relied solely on indoor application 
of the insecticide  DDT to control mosquito populations.  The campaign 
was a failure relative to its initial bold goal of total eradication,  but it 
did succeed in eliminating malaria in a limited geographic range, mainly 
the areas of  southern Europe from which  the disease  was  already be- 
ginning  to recede  by the early  1950s,  and the islands  of Jamaica and 
Taiwan.  Other  notable  successes  during  this  period  included  Hong 
33.  Mathematical  modeling employs the concept of the basic reproduction  number 
(BRN) of a disease, defined for microparasites  such as malaria  as the number  of sec- 
ondary  infections  deriving  from  each  primary  infection  in a totally  susceptible  population 
(May and Anderson, 1990). Restated  as a rate per day based on entomological  param- 
eters, the BRN is termed  vectorial  capacity  (VC) and is expressed  as 
VC  ma2p' 
-lnp 
where m is mosquito  density (relative to human  population);  a is the number  of bites 
per mosquito  per person  per day; n is the length of the extrinsic  incubation  period;  p is 
the duration  of mosquito  life; and e is the natural  logarithm  base, that is, about  2.718 
(Garret-Jones  and  Shidrawi,  1969). This equation  demonstrates  that  the transmission  of 
malaria  is sustained  when the vector  population  is long-lived and  primarily  bites human 
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Kong,  Mauritius, and Singapore,  all of which were greatly advantaged 
by their island geography,  and Malaysia,  where the prevalence of mos- 
quitoes  was easier to control for other reasons. 
In sum, the failure of Africa to control the disease  is not mainly the 
result of  poor public  health measures,  unresponsive  governments,  or 
poverty, but rather is due to the natural environment, in which mosquito 
longevity  exceeds  the latency period of mosquito infectivity.  Moreover, 
Anopheles  gambiae,  the most effective  vector of falciparum malaria, is 
exclusive  to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although the development  implications  of malaria and other vector- 
borne diseases  are hard to ascertain with precision,  they are likely  to 
be very serious.  Numerous  studies have estimated the microeconomic 
costs  of the disease,  including  both direct and indirect costs.  Personal 
medical  care  costs,  including  expenditures  on  medicines,  treatment 
fees,  transportation to health facilities,  and prevention  measures such 
as bed nets and insecticides,  have been estimated to range between  $5 
and $75  per household  per year  in  Africa.34 Furthermore, there  are 
public health expenditures on prevention and treatment of the disease. 
These  differ greatly across the region and are not easy  to estimate,  as 
the symptoms  of malaria often make it difficult to identify.  Estimates 
of  the loss  of  productivity  associated  with  malaria vary widely.  In a 
recent review  of  studies that estimate  time lost due both to the illness 
itself and to the care of sick family members, Reginald Chima and Anne 
Mills  report a range of one to five days of productivity loss  per person 
due to adult illness,  and one to four days loss  per sick child.  Malaria 
also reduces the returns to investment in schooling,  as it causes children 
to  miss  school  days  and is  believed  to  diminish  long-term  cognitive 
performance.  Incorporating both direct medical costs  and costs  of lost 
productivity,  Donald Shepard and others estimated that the annual eco- 
nomic burden of malaria in Africa was $0.8  billion  in 1987,  represent- 
ing 0.6  percent of  GDP,  and projected  a rise to  1 percent of  GDP in 
1995 due to increasing  severity  and drug resistance.35 
We  hypothesize  that the  indirect  costs  of  falciparum  malaria are 
much higher than the direct costs,  though this is merely  a conjecture 
based on macroeconomic  evidence.  Sachs and John Gallup have found 
34.  See Chima  and Mills (1998). 
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in cross-country  growth equations that falciparum malaria is associated 
with reduced annual GDP growth of more than 1 percentage point, after 
controlling  for other standard policy  and structural variables.36 We sur- 
mise  that these  high costs  come  not only  through microeconomic  ef- 
fects,  but also from barriers to technical  diffusion  and foreign  invest- 
ment in endemic  malarial regions.  Historical  accounts  of  interactions 
between Africa and the rest of the world in the past 500 years repeatedly 
stress  that malaria has been  a major barrier-perhaps  the major bar- 
rier-to  Africa's  normal integration into the world economy.  Until the 
advent of  quinine  in the second  half of the nineteenth  century,  Euro- 
peans  could  barely  survive  in coastal  settlements,  much less  venture 
into the interior. As of  1790, there were only around 25,000  Europeans 
living  in continental Africa,  of which an estimated 21,000  (84 percent) 
lived  in the temperate-zone  Cape Colony.37 
Richard  Hall  describes  the  period  of  Portuguese  exploration  and 
colonization  on the African coastline  as follows:  "Eastern Africa and 
western India were the obvious  places  where a good  harbor and some 
surrounding land might be seized  then declared  a Portuguese  posses- 
sion.  Africa,  however,  had already proved to be infested  with deadly 
fevers:  the  Kilwa  fort  .  .  . had to be  abandoned  after  only  seven  years. 
On the mainland further south,  small trading stations set up at Sofala 
and Mozambique were intended to give  succour to ships which had just 
rounded the Cape, but these ships often discovered more dead and dying 
on  shore than they were themselves  carrying."38 Similarly,  historian 
C.  L.  R.  Boxer  points  to  malaria  as  one  of  the  main  reasons  why 
Portugal did not found  a colony  in Luanda (Angola)  in the  sixteenth 
century.39 And  nineteenth  century  explorer  David  Livingstone  cited 
quinine,  together  with  the  breech-loading  rifle,  as  vital  tools  in  his 
mission  to "civilize"  Africa. 
Malaria continues to present serious obstacles  to foreign investment 
and tourism in  many  parts of  Africa.  Foreign  businessmen  lack  the 
immunity acquired by African  adults who  have experienced  repeated 
bouts of malaria since early childhood.  Prophylaxis with existing  med- 
icines is imperfect and often not feasible  for periods longer than a few 
36.  Gallup  and Sachs (1998b). 
37.  Hugon  (1993, p. 18). 
38.  Hall (1996, pp. 214-15). 
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weeks.  Conversely,  malaria is a problem for Africans who travel abroad 
for prolonged stays,  since their acquired immunity will diminish within 
months if not boosted  by repeated infection. 
HIV/AIDS.  This is perhaps the most daunting health problem currently 
hanging over Africa's  economic  future-even  more daunting than ma- 
laria.  From 1985 to  1995,  over 4 million  Africans died of AIDS,  and 
nearly 10 million  more deaths are expected  by 2005.  Of the more than 
30 million people in the world living with the HIV infection,  21 million 
are in sub-Saharan Africa.  Among  HIV-infected  people  in the world, 
six out of ten men, eight out of ten women,  and nine out of ten children 
live  in Africa.  In 1998  an estimated  600,000  babies  in Africa  will  be 
born with HIV; many more will  be infected  as infants through breast 
feeding,  which is currently chosen  as a better option than costly  infant 
formula mixed  with unsafe  water.  And AIDS  has greatly jeopardized 
the economic  and social futures of 8 million  African children who have 
been orphaned by the disease.  Nearly half of the world's  16,000  new 
HIV infections  per day occur in Africa,  which,  given  the lengthy time 
lag (about eight to ten years for adults) between infection  and the onset 
of  clinical  symptoms,  suggests  that the AIDS  epidemic  will  continue 
well  into the future. As over 80 percent of AIDS deaths have occurred 
among twenty to forty-nine year olds, the epidemic is offsetting decades 
of  normal  improvement  in  life  expectancy  in  several  African 
countries .40 
HIV  infection  rates vary  considerably  across  countries  in  Africa. 
Surveillance  data collected  among representative  samples  of pregnant 
women suggest  that one in four adults in Botswana,  Zambia, and Zim- 
babwe is infected,  with rates approaching one in three in a number of 
urban areas.  By  contrast,  HIV  prevalence  is  considerably  lower  in 
Angola  (2.1  percent),  Equatorial Guinea  (1.2  percent),  and Senegal 
(1.8  percent).  Complicating  the problem is the fact that several  types 
and subtypes  of  the virus are spreading at different  rates in different 
parts of the continent.  At least one subtype, HIV-I-C,  is rapidly spread- 
ing throughout southern Africa and is replacing other subtypes currently 
common  in East Africa. 
In contrast to malaria, it is difficult to link geography definitively  to 
the  virulence  of  the current AIDS  epidemic,  but because  of  its  eco- 
40.  Bloom and others  (1996); UNAIDS (1998). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  235 
nomic,  social,  and cultural conditions,  Africa is extremely  vulnerable 
to the  spread of  HIV.  Specific  factors that underlie Africa's  extreme 
vulnerability  include  high  rates of  multiple  sexual  partnering and of 
sexually  transmitted diseases;  widespread use of untested and contam- 
inated blood and blood products and nonsterile medical practices; reli- 
ance on breast feeding,  which  carries a 10 to  14 percent risk of  HIV 
transmission from an infected mother to her child; low rates of condom 
use; low levels of education; and very high proportions of the population 
in the sexually  active  years (see  below).4'  In addition,  large numbers 
of intracontinental migrants and refugees and high rates of urbanization, 
especially  among young men seeking  seasonal  work,  contribute to the 
spread of HIV via social  patterns and practices arising from increased 
anonymity  and separation from family. 
HIV/AIDS  imposes a heavy economic  burden on many African econ- 
omies.  Notwithstanding  the inaccessibility  of the expensive  ($16,000 
per year)  "drug cocktails"  currently used to treat those infected  with 
HIV in wealthy industrial countries,  the costs of detecting the infection 
and treating its clinical  manifestations-for  example,  pneumonia,  tu- 
berculosis,  diarrhea, and fever-are  significant  and well  in excess  of 
per capita public  expenditures  on health care in Africa,  which  range 
between  $10  and $15  per year.  Access  to  health  care centers  is  ex- 
tremely  limited  in many rural areas of  Africa,  and the transportation 
costs  can represent a nontrivial share of household  income.  There are 
currently no vaccines,  cures,  or inexpensive  treatments available  for 
HIV infection,  and due to the scientific  complexity  of the virus and its 
ability to mutate, there are none in sight. 
HIV  infection  is  also  exacerbating  the burden of  other major dis- 
eases.  As  the greatest  risk factor  for the progression  of  tuberculosis 
infection  from the  primary-latent phase  to  the  active  phase,  HIV  is 
contributing to the resurgence of tuberculosis  in Africa.  An estimated 
12 million  Africans  are infected  with  both  HIV  and Mycobacterium 
41.  Recent trials have demonstrated  that mother  to infant transmission  can be re- 
duced by up to 50 percent through  the use of oral ziduvidine (AZT) by mothers in 
resource-poor  settings. Although the cost of this drug protocol is roughly $70 per 
treatment,  UNAIDS has succeeded in persuading  its producer, Glaxo-Wellcome, to 
negotiate  agreements  with  different  countries  in the hope of reducing  that  cost. However, 
most African  countries  have yet to negotiate  such agreements.  Also, the ancillary  costs 
associated  with HIV testing and counseling may make this treament  prohibitively  ex- 
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tuberculosis.  In 1990 there were over 7 million cases of tuberculosis in 
Africa,  and over 500,000  deaths.  Like malaria and HIV,  tuberculosis 
has a great proclivity  for mutating into drug-resistant strains,  making 
treatment (if any exists)  extremely  costly. 
Perhaps even more important than the direct medical costs of AIDS, 
however,  are the indirect costs embodied in loss of income and output. 
Because  heterosexual  sex  is  the  dominant  transmission  category  for 
HIV  in Africa,  AIDS  tends  disproportionately  to  afflict  working-age 
adults, greatly exacerbating the economic  burden imposed by the med- 
ical care costs  associated  with the disease.  John Cuddington and John 
Hancock estimate the impact of AIDS on economic  growth in Tanzania 
and Malawi,  using  macrosimulation  models,  and find an average  re- 
duction  of  GDP per capita growth of 0.25  percentage  point per year. 
Using  similar  models,  Mead Over estimates  a reduction of  0. 15 per- 
centage  point in sub-Saharan Africa.  By contrast, using cross-country 
data from 1980 to  1992,  Bloom  and Ajay Mahal find no evidence  of a 
statistically  significant effect of AIDS on the growth rate of income per 
capita; however,  their point estimates  are negative  and comparable in 
magnitude to those reported by Over.42 
Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic may also have important consequences 
for poverty and income inequality. The early data from Africa suggested 
a positive  association between HIV infection and affluence, presumably 
because  the  number of  partners and the  demand for commercial  sex 
increase  with  income.  However,  more  recent  data reveal  a growing 
linkage  between  HIV  infection  and poverty,  mainly  because  the un- 
educated have the least access  to knowledge  about which behaviors put 
them at high  risk for contracting or transmitting HIV.  The virus thus 
has considerable  potential to further impoverish  Africa's  poor. 
Transport Barriers  and Economic Development  in Africa 
Poor agricultural and health conditions  would be barriers enough to 
African growth,  as they have been in other parts of the tropics. Yet the 
situation is made much worse by the continent's  remarkable disadvan- 
tages  in  transport costs.  The  factors  underlying  these  disadvantages 
include  the great distance  from major world  markets in the northern 
42.  Cuddington  (1993): Cuddington  and Hancock  (1994); Over (1992); Bloom and 
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midlatitudes-a  common plight of the tropics-in  particular, separation 
from  Europe  by  the  vast  Sahara desert,  larger  than the  continental 
United  States;  a very  small  coastline  relative  to  land area; very  few 
natural coastal ports; populations generally far from the coast; the high- 
est proportion of  landlocked  states,  and the highest  proportion of the 
population within landlocked  states,  of any continent; and the absence 
of rivers leading into the interior of the continent that are navigable by 
ocean-going  vessels,  as are the Rhine,  the Mississippi,  the Amazon, 
and the Yangtze  on other continents.43 Sachs  has demonstrated else- 
where  that differences  in transport costs,  appropriately defined,  can 
help to explain  differences  in overall growth performance.44 
Adam Smith noted Africa's  disadvantages for trade 222 years ago in 
the  Wealth of Nations.  He  first stressed  the importance of  sea-based 
trade to an extensive  division  of labor and then drew implications  for 
Africa and Central Asia: 
As by means of water-carriage  a more extensive market  is opened to 
every sort of industry  than what land-carriage  alone can afford it, so it 
is  upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of  navigable rivers, that 
industry  of every kind naturally  begins to subdivide  and improve  itself, 
and it is frequently  not till a long time after that those improvements 
extend themselves  to the inland  parts  of the country. ... 
All the inland  parts  of Africa, and all that  part  of Asia which lies any 
considerable  way north of  the Euxine [Black] and Caspian seas, the 
antient  Scythia, the modern  Tartary  and Siberia, seem in all ages of the 
world  to have been in the same barbarous  and uncivilized state in which 
we  find them at present.  .  .  .  There  are in  Africa  none  of  those  great 
inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic  seas in Europe,  the Mediterranean 
and Euxine seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulphs of Arabia, 
Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in Asia, to carry maritime  commerce 
into the interior  parts  of that great  continent.45 
Table 2 shows that Smith's concerns about "inland"  Africa continue 
to be important today. Only a small proportion of Africa's  population, 
43.  In regard  to length of coastline relative to land area, note that while western 
Europe  has about  one-eighth  the land area  of Africa  (3.5 million km2  compared  with 29 
million  kM2), its coastline  is about  50 percent  longer  (54,000 km compared  with 35,000 
km). In regard  to water-borne  access to the interior,  all of Africa's major  rivers, includ- 
ing the Nile, the Niger, the Congo, and  the Zambezi,  have sharp  cataracts. 
44.  Radelet  and Sachs (1998). 
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around 19 percent, lives within 100 km of the coast. If one also includes 
populations close to rivers navigable by ocean-going  vessels,  this figure 
only  rises  to  21  percent,  as compared  with  67  percent in the United 
States and 89 percent in western Europe. Much of the population lives 
in  the  interior highlands,  presumably  attracted there by  agricultural 
considerations  of  cooler  temperatures  and better  precipitation.  The 
problems of population distribution are compounded by political bound- 
aries: there are no  fewer  than fourteen  landlocked  African  countries 
with populations in excess  of 1 million,  and fully 28 percent of the sub- 
Saharan population lives  in landlocked  economies. 
Table  2  also  reports  population  densities  near the  coast  (within 
100 km)  and inland  (beyond  100  km).  Based  on  earlier research  by 
Gallup and Sachs,  we expect  a high coastal population density to sup- 
port economic  growth  by facilitating  a richer division  of  labor.46 By 
contrast, high inland population densities appear to be neutral or detract 
from economic  growth.  Isolated  populations  are not  able  to  enjoy  a 
high division  of labor because  many of the inputs needed for modern 
production  must come  from  international trade.  High  transport costs 
frustrate the needed trade linkages and keep the inland market too small 
to  support a refined  division  of  labor.  Table  2  shows  that Africa's 
coastal population density is the lowest  of any region in the world,  for 
reasons already noted: an unusually  high proportion of the population 
is settled in the interior, where agriculture prospects  are better. Inland 
population densities  are also  fairly low  compared with other regions, 
but they are high relative to coastal population densities  in Africa. 
In  addition,  table  2  reports one  convenient  summary measure  of 
transport costs  on imports: the ratio of import prices including  cost of 
insurance and freight (CIF) to free on board (FOB) import prices.  The 
CIF-to-FOB ratio is much higher in Africa than for any other region. 
In  1995  the unweighted  CIF-to-FOB  ratio for African  countries  was 
1. 195 (that is,  CIF prices were  19.5  percent higher than FOB prices), 
compared with  1.098  for East Asia,  and 1. 106 for Latin America. 
The bottom line  is  extraordinarily high  transport costs,  especially 
over land within the continent,  but also from low-volume  sea ports to 
major markets in Europe,  the United  States,  and Asia.  According  to 
World  Bank estimates,  for  example,  in  1995  the  cost  of  shipping  a 
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twenty-foot-equivalent  container from the West African port of Dakar 
to landlocked Bamako, Mali,  a distance of around 1,000 km, was equal 
to $770,  which is approximately 45 percent of the cost of shipping the 
container  from Dakar to  Rotterdam ($1,610),  a shipping  distance  of 
around 5,000  km. Moreover,  a container shipment from Dakar to Rot- 
terdam cost  around the same amount as a shipment from Singapore to 
Rotterdam, despite the fact that the latter distance (via the Suez Canal) 
is  roughly  17,000  km.  This  high  cost  of  sea  transport per  shipping 
kilometer probably reflects the relatively low volumes of trade and lack 
of competitiveness  of Africa's  ports. 
Demography in Africa 
Between  1950  and  1995,  Africa's  population  grew  at an average 
annual rate of 2.6  percent and more than trebled, reaching 561 million. 
This rate of increase is historically unprecedented among major regions 
of the world over comparable lengths of time. Asia and Latin America, 
the other main developing  regions,  have also experienced  rapid popu- 
lation growth during the past half century, but at the lower rates of 2.0 
percent and 2.3  percent, respectively.47 Figure 5 shows Africa's  shares 
of world income  and population from  1820 to  1992.  Africa's  share of 
world population  was  fairly constant  and below  5 percent from  1820 
until  around  1915  but  has  increased  steadily  since,  reaching  over 
8  percent  in  the  early  1990s.48  A  rising  share  of  world  population 
coupled  with a relatively  constant share of world income  is one of the 
most important stylized  facts of Africa's  postindependence  experience. 
Population  Density,  Urbanization,  and Ethnic Fractionalization 
Most  of  Africa  is  sparsely  populated,  with  an average  population 
density of twenty-five  persons per square kilometer,  as compared with 
148 persons  in Asia.  This low  average population  density  reflects the 
weighted  combination  of vast expanses  of almost empty desert (Chad 
47.  United Nations (1996); available  on diskette. 
48.  Maddison (1995).  By contrast, from 1700 to  1900 Africa's share of  world 
population  was declining or fairly constant, as the slave trade  resulted  in an absolute 
depopulation  of the continent  from 100 million in 1700 to a low of 90 million in 1850, 
and population  growth  accelerated  in Europe  (see Tarver, 1996; Austen, 1987). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  241 
Figure 5. Africa's  Share of World Income  and Population,  1820-1992' 
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has five people per square kilometer),  large areas of sparsely populated 
savannas with weak agricultural potential,  and few  areas of relatively 
dense  population.  Regions  of  relatively  high  population  density  are 
mainly in the East African highlands near the Great Lakes-in  partic- 
ular,  Burundi and Rwanda-as  well  as  the  section  of  coast  running 
from southern Cote d'Ivoire  to Nigeria,  and the Indian Ocean  island 
economies,  for example,  Reunion and Mauritius. 
The low  levels  of  population  density  are reflected  in low  levels  of 
urbanization.  Only  31  percent  of  Africa's  population  lives  in  urban 
centers.49 This contrasts sharply with the high level  of urbanization in 
Latin  America  (74  percent),  but  is  comparable  with  that  in  Asia 
(30  percent).  Furthermore, African  urban centers  are small  by world 
standards. The largest sub-Saharan city,  Lagos,  ranks nineteenth in the 
world.  Some  capital cities,  such as Gaborone in Botswana,  are little 
more than trading posts.  Despite  lower fertility rates in Africa's  urban 
49.  World Bank (1998). 242  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
centers  as compared with  its rural areas,  urban population  growth  is 
proceeding  more rapidly than in any other region of the world-about 
5 percent per year since  1965-as  a result of large-scale migration from 
rural areas.50 
Two  main factors  would  seem  to explain  the very low  rates of  ur- 
banization in Africa.  First, agricultural productivity is very low.  Local 
food  production  cannot  support large urban areas.  Many  of  Africa's 
urban areas must be fed,  at least  in part, from international imports. 
Second,  much of the population is in the highlands,  or at least far from 
the coast or navigable  rivers.  However,  urban centers are strongly fa- 
vored  by  coastal  (or riverine)  locations,  because  low  transport costs 
facilitate  trade.  In  Africa,  urbanization  has  tended  to  be  associated 
either with administrative  and political  capitals,  economically  depen- 
dent  on  government  spending  rather than on  their own  international 
exports earnings; or with service  centers for mining economies,  living 
on the foreign  exchange  earned in the mining  region  rather than ex- 
porting to world markets. Thus as of  1994,  the highest rates of urban- 
ization  in Africa  were  found  in Congo  (58  percent),  an oil  exporter; 
Mauritania (52  percent),  an iron ore exporter; South Africa  (50  per- 
cent), a gold and diamond exporter; Gabon (49 percent), an oil exporter; 
Cameroon  (44  percent),  an oil  exporter; and Zambia  (43  percent),  a 
copper exporter. 
Low population densities  and low rates of urbanization tend to raise 
the costs  of  providing  infrastructure services  such  as road networks, 
telephone  systems,  container port services,  and urban sewerage.  They 
are therefore important factors,  in addition to low  income,  in the very 
poor state of African infrastructure, which (other than in South Africa 
and Mauritius) is among the worst in the world.  As one example,  the 
total length  of paved roads in all of  sub-Saharan Africa except  South 
Africa  was  estimated  to be  171,000  km as of  1992,  about  16 percent 
less  than the total of  paved roads in Poland,  about 206,000  km.  Yet 
Poland has a mere 1.4 percent of the corresponding land area and just 
8 percent of the corresponding population, and is also not a high-income 
country.  Moreover,  the World Bank estimates  that just  39 percent of 
the sparse network of paved roads in Africa are in good condition.  As 
another example,  Africa had approximately 2.4 million main telephone 
50.  Cohen  (1993). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  243 
lines in 1995, or 0.47  lines per one hundred households,  about the same 
number of phone lines  as in Norway,  which has less  than 1 percent of 
Africa's  population. 
Africa's  demography,  together  with  its  geography,  no  doubt  also 
account  for  a  factor  much  discussed  in  recent  writings  on  African 
growth: the extent of linguistic  diversity.  Linguistic  diversity has been 
taken as a measure of strong ethnic cleavages  in African societies  and 
as a barrier to trade, and thereby as a potential explanation of Africa's 
growth  shortfall.  But  we  are skeptical  of  using  it as  an explanatory 
variable  in this  way,  since  linguistic  diversity  is  itself  a function  of 
demographic  and geographical  variables  that have  a large  and direct 
effect  on economic  performance. We find that African countries do not 
in fact have an especially  high rate of linguistic diversity compared with 
other regions of the world,  once one accounts for tropical environment 
(which,  by restricting  mobility,  may plausibly  promote  linguistic  di- 
versity),  the low  proportion of  the population  near the coastline,  the 
low  population  density,  and a dummy variable for Latin America  and 
the Caribbean (reflecting  the extinction  of many ethnic  and linguistic 
groups following  the Spanish colonization  and the accompanying  de- 
mographic collapse). 
Delayed  Demographic  Transition 
While  most of the developing  world has undergone a demographic 
transition from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low 
mortality, this process has stalled or progressed exceedingly  slowly  in 
Africa.  As in most of the developing  world,  mortality declined  sharply 
in Africa with the introduction of  modern public  health practices  and 
health technologies  after World War 11.51 The impact on child survival 
was particularly large, because antimicrobials are often powerful treat- 
ments for infectious  diseases  such as acute respiratory infections  and 
diarrheal disorders.52  Yet in contrast to other developing  regions,  Africa 
has not experienced corresponding declines  in fertility to any apprecia- 
ble degree (until, perhaps, very recently). 
51.  These health  technologies  include chloroquine,  sulfa drugs, and powerful  anti- 
biotics such as penicillin  and streptomycin,  as well as DDT, which became  available  in 
1943. 
52.  While  life expectancy  increased  by roughly  20 percent  from 1960 to 1995, infant 
mortality  fell by 40 percent,  from 159 to 96 deaths  per thousand  births. 244  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
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The combination  of falling death rates, concentrated  in the youth 
cohort, and stable birth  rates  have had two principal  demographic  con- 
sequences:  rapid  population  growth  and a skewing of the age structure 
toward  the young ages. These trends  are illustrated  in figure 6. Popu- 
lation growth averaged 2.3  percent in the 1950s, 2.4  percent in the 
1960s, 2.7 percent  in the 1970s, and 2.9 percent  from 1980 to present. 
By contrast, in Asia and Latin America  population  growth  has fallen, 
from rates  of 2.4 percent  and 2.7 percent,  respectively, in the 1960s to 
rates of 1.5 percent  and 1.7 percent, respectively, over 1990-95.  Af- 
rica's current population growth rate, which implies  a doubling of the 
population in less than twenty-five years, is huge by historical and 
comparative  standards  and is certainly not sustainable  over the long 
run. 
Figures  6 and  7 show that  accelerating  population  growth  has swelled David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  245 
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the youth cohort,  and consequently  decreased the ratio of the working- 
age  to dependent  populations.  The  working-age  population  (between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty-four)  is roughly half of the total population 
of Africa,  and this share has actually  fallen  slightly  since  1950.  This 
contrasts with the higher (60 to 70 percent) and generally  rising share 
found in other regions.  Cross-country  data indicate  that the working- 
age population  in Africa  grew  at an almost  identical  rate to the total 
population from 1965 to 1990.  In the rest of the world, by contrast, the 
working-age population grew,  on average, 0.35  percent per year faster 
than the total population over the same period. This difference between 
African and world trends accounts  for Africa's  relatively  high  youth 
dependency ratio. Africa's youth dependency burden poses a significant 
impediment to the growth of income  per capita,  since labor force par- 
ticipation,  productivity,  and saving are low among the dependent pop- 
ulation,  relative both to the working-age  population  and to their own 
consumption and investment requirements. 
Table 3,  which reports total fertility rates and infant mortality rates ON  r,  -  C'J  00  C'J  O 
I  I I  I 
11111 
t-00  00  O 
Cu  ~  ~ ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~- David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  247 
across  major world  regions,  demonstrates  Africa's  divergence  from 
demographic trends elsewhere.  It is striking that African fertility  is so 
closely  comparable to that observed  in Asia  and Latin America  in the 
1950s.  Africa's  demographic uniqueness,  therefore,  is not in the level 
of  fertility  but in the persistence  of  such  a high  level  in the  face  of 
declining  mortality rates. High fertility is the most salient feature of the 
continent's  stalled demographic transition and the cause of its acceler- 
ating population growth and remarkably young age structure. 
Contraceptive  use  increased  modestly  from  a prevalence  rate of 
5 percent  in  1960  to  17 percent  in  1990.  In East Asia  contraceptive 
prevalence  increased from  13 to 75 percent over the same period,  and 
even  in  poorer  South  Asia,  usage  increased  from  7  to  41  percent.53 
Table  4  summarizes  fertility  and contraceptive  prevalence  data col- 
lected  in household  surveys  in seventeen  African countries  in the late 
1980s and early  1990s.  The most striking feature of the table is that in 
most countries not only total fertility rates but also  "wanted"  fertility 
rates,  are above  5.0.  Thus the provision  of contraceptives  is by itself 
unlikely to reduce fertility significantly.  Africa's  population problem is 
one of high desired fertility,  rather than a need for contraceptive  ser- 
vices.  In contrast to other developing  regions,  eliminating  unwanted 
fertility  would  have negligible  to small effects  on the achievement  of 
replacement fertility levels  (2. 1 children per woman).  Indeed, Africa's 
low  levels  of  unwanted fertility  are consistent  with the pattern of ex- 
tremely low rates of contraceptive  prevalence  among married women. 
High fertility in Africa probably reflects a combination of low socio- 
economic  development  (for example,  in terms of education and gender 
inequality)  and sociocultural  practices  that reinforce  a preference  for 
large families.  There is an extensive  literature on the determinants of 
fertility in Africa.s4 This literature notes that even  after accounting for 
differences  in infant mortality,  income,  education,  and urbanization, 
Africa typically  remains a positive  outlier.55 Explaining why this is so 
is an important research question. 
53.  Bongaarts  (1994). 
54.  See,  for example, Boserup (1985); Caldwell and Caldwell (1987); Caldwell 
(1991, 1994);  Bledsoe (1994); Ainsworth,  Beegle, and Nyamete (1995); Pitt (1995). 
55.  Chesnais  (1992); Cohen  (1993). Chesnais  also provides  a discussion  of variance 
of socioeconomic "thresholds" and the onset of fertility decline in a not exclusively 
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We can identify  two sets of factors that appear to be related to high 
fertility  in  Africa.  First,  in  rural areas of  Africa  market activity  is 
limited  and corresponding  financial  institutions  are poorly,  if  at all, 
developed,  so that the scope for saving for old age is limited.  Therefore 
children continue to be viewed  as the current generation's  main source 
of old age insurance. Similarly,  formal labor market activity is limited, 
which tends to reduce the perceived  costs to fertility.  Children are also 
an important source of labor in rural settings,  assisting  both in small- 
holder cash crop agriculture, such as coffee,  and in household  work.56 
Second,  sociocultural  institutions and practices encourage large family 
sizes.  The long history of low population densities  and the ever-present 
struggle  for  survival  in an environment  of  drought,  low  crop yields, 
slave  trade, and infectious  disease  no doubt led to powerful  norms of 
high fertility and large families,  and these have changed only slowly  in 
the face of rapidly declining  infant mortality rates and rising population 
densities  that  limit  the  availability  of  farm  land  to  divide  among 
children. 
Social  structures that promote high  fertility  include  fostering  chil- 
dren, communal  land tenure,  and polygyny.  The common  practice of 
children being raised in households  headed by someone other than their 
parents reduces  the costs  of  raising  children.  John Caldwell  and Pat 
Caldwell report that in West Africa as many as one-third of all children 
live in this way.57 In addition, communal land tenure places a premium 
on family  size,  as village  leaders  distribute land according  to family 
"need."  In a system  where  there is  no private title  to land but land 
remains the primary factor of production,  having a large family  is the 
best way  to acquire access  to increased  resources.  Finally,  polygyny 
continues to be widely practiced in Africa, especially  West Africa,  and 
dilutes family and paternal bonds.  Each wife  comprises  a discrete eco- 
nomic unit within the family,  responsible  for the care of her children. 
Husbands, while they have access to the fruits of their children's labor, 
have little responsibility  for their welfare. 
To test some of these hypotheses,  we assembled an unbalanced panel 
data set for 103 countries at six points in time between  1960 and 1990. 
We regressed the log  of the total fertility  rate on income  and income 
56.  Caldwell  (1982, 1991). 
57.  Caldwell  and  Caldwell  (1987); see also Bledsoe (1994). 250  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
squared,  infant mortality,  schooling,  gender gaps in schooling,  geog- 
raphy, time,  and financial market depth (measured by the ratio of liquid 
liabilities  to  GDP).  The  results  reveal  that fertility  tends  to  increase 
with infant mortality and tropical location.  They also reveal that fertility 
has  tended  to  decline  over  time,  and that it decreases  with  income, 
education,  the  degree  of  gender  equality  in  schooling,  and financial 
market depth. In addition, there is considerable fertility variation across 
geoclimatic  regions,  for example,  tropical and subtropical wet and dry 
climates.  Finally,  an Africa dummy has a small but significant positive 
coefficient,  consistent with other literature on the subject. These results 
imply  that high  fertility  rates in Africa  will  decline  as economic  and 
social  development  proceeds. 
Implications  of Demographic  Change in Africa 
The  dominance  of  youth  in Africa's  population  creates  enormous 
momentum for continued population growth.  Even if the total fertility 
rate were immediately  reduced to the replacement level  of 2. 1 children 
per  woman,  Africa's  population  would  still  increase  to  more  than 
1 billion  (that is, by over 50 percent) during the next century, as today's 
children progress through their prime childbearing years.58 Correspond- 
ingly,  dependency  ratios would  remain high  for decades,  depressing 
the growth of income per capita, as discussed  below.  Much of the most 
rapid  population  growth  in  Africa  is  occurring  in  the  regions  least 
suitable  for rapid economic  growth: rural, landlocked,  and arid areas 
that are already under tremendous demographic  stress.59 Rising  popu- 
lation  densities  in  these  low-productivity  interior  regions  not  only 
threaten economic  growth but also intensify environmental degradation 
through deforestation,  soil erosion,  and the depletion  of aquifers. 
Rapid population growth imposes  a great burden on African govern- 
ments  in the provision  of  basic  education.  Indeed,  Africa  is the only 
region of the world in which school  enrollment rates fell during recent 
decades  (though the quality of the data is uncertain). According  to the 
World Bank,  between  1980 and 1993 primary school  enrollment rates 
in  sub-Saharan Africa  fell  from 68  percent  to  65  percent of  the pri- 
mary  school  age  cohort  for  females  and  from  90  percent  to 
58.  Bongaarts  (1999). 
59.  Gallup  and Sachs (1998a). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  251 
78  percent of the cohort for males.60 Nonetheless,  increased  numbers 
of primary school  graduates (due to overall population growth) has led 
to increased demand for secondary education,  which has also strained 
education budgets.  In addition,  it is extremely  difficult to improve the 
low  quality of  education  in Africa  when  the school-age  population  is 
growing  so fast.  For example,  for the  106 developing  countries  with 
data for 1990,  the correlation between  the number of students per pri- 
mary school  teacher and the ratio of the dependent to total population 
is 0.52.  Spending per primary school  student in Africa,  at an average 
of $126  per year (1985  PPP-adjusted),  represents only 45 percent and 
30 percent of that in Latin America and Asia,  respectively.  The number 
of students per teacher (forty-three) is much higher than in Latin Amer- 
ica (twenty-eight)  and Asia  (thirty-two). 
Evidence on African Growth from 
Cross-Country Growth Regressions 
Empirical cross-country  growth equations  are now well  established 
as a tool  among development  economists  and have been employed  by 
Sachs  and Andrew  Warner in the  case  of  Africa.62 In this  paper we 
extend  those  earlier  results,  for  example,  by  including  new  demo- 
graphic and geographic data, but the basic results are very similar. Such 
models  are typically  based on the Solow-Swan  or Ramsey  models  of 
output per worker.63 Equations  1 and 2 capture their essence: 
(1)  gy  =  o(Y*  -  y), 
where  g,  is  the  growth  rate of  output per  worker,  a  is  the  rate of 
convergence  to the steady state, y* represents the steady-state level  of 
income per worker in logarithms,  and y, represents current income per 
worker. Equation  1 implies  that a country's  rate of growth at a given 
time  is proportional to the difference  between  its current log  income 
and its steady-state income.  The poorer a country is with respect to its 
steady  state,  the  faster  it  can  be  expected  to  grow:  the  conditional 
60.  World  Bank  (1997a). 
61.  Barro  and Lee (1997). 
62.  Sachs and Warner  (1997). 
63.  See Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995) for a detailed  description. 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
convergence hypothesis. The higher a country's steady-state  level of 
income, the faster  its expected  rate  of growth  for a given level of initial 
income. 
Empirically,  the steady state is assumed  to be determined  by a set of 
factors 
(2)  y  =X, 
where X is a matrix of variables that typically includes measures of 
human  capital, health  status, natural  resource  abundance,  and  economic 
policy. Substituting  equation  2 into equation  1 and  adding  an error  term 
E yields the estimable equation 
(3)  gy=oty,  + O43X  + E. 
Although  the foregoing model refers  to output  per worker,  economic 
growth is usually operationalized  in terms of output  per capita, which 
is preferable  as a measure of welfare. Following Bloom and Jeffrey 
Williamson, we account for this difference by noting the following 
identity:64 
y  (y(pw\ 
(4)  pT  (p)(PT) 
where pT  iS  total population;  pw is the working-age population  (ages 
fifteen to sixty-four), for which more accurate  data are available for 
more  countries  than  is true  of labor  force data;  and  Y  is aggregate  output. 
Taking differentials  gives 
(5)  g  =  gy  +  givorkers 
-  gpopulatioiO 
where g,  is the growth rate of GDP per capita and gy is the growth rate 
of GDP per working-age person. Incorporating  this into the standard 
neoclassical model gives the following estimable equation  (with y1 = 
'Y2  =  1): 
(6)  =  y  YT  +  a  13  X  +  ylI1gworkers  Y2gpopulation  +  E. 
The introduction  of these two growth  rates on the right-hand  side of 
equation 6 is unnecessary  in demographically  stable populations, that 
is,  those in which the growth rates of all ages groups are identical. 
64.  Bloom and Williamson  (1999). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  253 
However, most populations  are highly destabilized. By including the 
population  growth rate and the growth rate of the economically active 
population, we account for the fact that a rising dependency  ratio im- 
plies a lower per capita growth rate, as the dependent population's 
contribution  to output is close to zero. In addition, there is some evi- 
dence of a negative association  between dependency  ratios and saving 
rates.65  In populations  with high rates of fertility, there are large num- 
bers of young dependents  who need to be fed, clothed, housed, edu- 
cated, and provided with medical care, but who contribute  relatively 
little to aggregate output. As the size of the working-age population 
increases relative to the total population, the per capita productive 
capacity of the economy expands. This expansion, which may result 
from either increased employment  per capita or increased saving per 
capita, creates  the potential  for more  rapid  growth  of per capita  income. 
If there are no direct effects of population  growth on steady-state 
income, the coefficients on gwvorkers  and  gpopulatiot,  should be 1 and - 1, 
respectively. However there  is an extensive literature  on the possibility 
of  such effects,  both positive and negative.66  Therefore we do not 
constrain  the coefficients either to be unity or to equal each other in 
absolute  terms. 
In addition to the demographic  variables, one must specify the X 
vector of explanatory variables. Our specification follows the large 
cross-country  growth  literature,  which in general includes policy vari- 
ables (for example, trade policy and fiscal policy), indicators  of the 
quality of public institutions, and proxies for human capital (for ex- 
ample, years of schooling) and public health (for example, life expec- 
tancy at birth). 
Our  strategy  is to add  two kinds of geographic  variables, one related 
to the tropics  and  the other, which is also demographic  in nature,  related 
to transport  conditions. In particular,  we introduce  the share  of a coun- 
try's land area in the geographic tropics as an explanatory  variable, 
expecting that tropical  land area will be associated with lower steady- 
state per capita income, y*, and therefore  with lower growth. We also 
introduce  population  density near  the coast (within 100 km) and popu- 
lation density away from the coast (further  than 100 km) as additional 
65.  Higgins and  Williamson  (1997); Kelley and Schmidt  (1996). 
66.  For positive effects, see Boserup (1981) and Kuznets (1973); for negative ef- 
fects, see Coale and  Hoover  (1958) and Ehrlich  (1968). 254  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
explanatory  variables. We expect that  high population  density near  the 
coast benefits growth and steady-state  income, by expanding  the size 
of the market  and  the division of labor;  whereas  high population  density 
away from the coast is either neutral  or negative, since remote regions 
are less likely to urbanize  and industrialize  and thereby  take advantage 
of an increased division of labor, while decreasing returns to scale 
associated with traditional  agriculture  are likely to reduce steady-state 
income.67  In earlier papers, we have used the ratio of the length of 
coastline to land area  as an additional  indicator  of a country's  access to 
international  trade,  as well as a dummy  variable  for whether  the country 
is landlocked. While the regression estimates suggest a clear positive 
role for coastal  populations  in growth,  they cannot  distinguish  precisely 
between  these alternative  measures  of proximity  to the coast. Therefore, 
in this paper  we choose to report  only the specifications  using coastal 
and interior  population  densities. 
We are especially interested  in the coefficient on life expectancy at 
birth  (our proxy for health status), which has a strong  connection with 
both geography  and demography  in Africa. Although  it is not an ideal 
measure  of health, it is widely available  and often used in this context. 
We interpret  it as capturing  possible effects of health on economic 
growth  that may operate  through  lower morbidity,  that is, a more pro- 
ductive labor force; higher returns  to investments in human capital, 
directly due to increased  longevity; and increased  saving at all ages for 
a longer period of retirement.68 
Econometric  Results 
We report  results from a standard  cross-country  specification  based 
on data for seventy-seven African and non-African  countries  over the 
period 1965-90. These data  are  described  in table 5. Regression  results 
are reported  in table 6. 
The first column of table 6 reports  results for a parsimonious  cross- 
country  regression  that excludes the geographic  and demographic  var- 
67.  See Gallup  and Sachs (1998a). 
68.  The theoretical  models and  empirical  results  discussed  here  do not address  some 
rather  thorny issues related to reverse causality. See Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 
(1998) for a detailed treatment  of these issues and for evidence that our basic findings 
are upheld when some of the potentially endogenous variables analyzed below are 
appropriately  instrumented. David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  255 
Table  5. Data Characteristics  for African and Non-African  Countriesa 
African  countries  Non-African  countries 
Standard  Standard 
Variable  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation 
GDP per  capita  growth,  1965-90  0.55  1.35  2.32  1.75 
In GDP per  capita, 1965  -0.13  0.55  1.04  0.83 
In GDP per worker, 1965  0.51  0.53  1.62  0.75 
In Years  secondary  schooling, 
1965b  -  1.95  1.25  -0.36  0.82 
Trade  opennessc  0.04  0.08  0.53  0.45 
Quality  of institutionsd  4.72  1.17  6.42  2.42 
Central  government  deficite  3.00  4.87  1.29  3.34 
Percent  tropical  land  area  0.94  0.23  0.41  0.47 
In  Coastal  population  density'  2.22  1.79  4.02  1.55 
In  Inland  population  densitylg  2.65  0.84  2.77  1.71 
Working-age  population  growth 
rate, 1965_90h  0.027  0.005  0.021  0.011 
Total  population  growth  rate, 
1965-90  0.028  0.005  0.017  0.010 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a  Sample comprises seventy-seven countries; eighteen African and fifty-nine non-African (including Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia). 
b. Average for working-age population, ages fifteen to sixty-four.  Data on secondary education are available only for 
sixty-nine countries, twelve African and fifty-seven non-African. 
c.  Percentage of years during 1965-90  that a country was open to foreign trade 
d. Unweighted average of five subindexes developed by Political Risk Services  rule of lawv  'reflects the degree to which 
the citizens  of  a country are willing  to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes"; bureaucratic quiality  measures 'autonomy from political pressure" and "strength and expertise to govern without 
drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services";  corruptiotn  in govertitnetit  measures whether "illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout" government, in the form of "bribes connected with import  and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans"; risk of expropriation refers to "outright confiscation" or 
"forced nationalization", government repudiatiotn  of conttracts  measures "risk of modification in a contract taking the forn 
of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down"; see Sachs and Warner  (1997). 
e.  Average over 1970-90,  as a share of GDP. 
f.  Within 100 km of coast 
g.  Further  than 100 km from coast. 
h. Ages fifteen to sixty-four. 
iables. We include five variables:  initial income, openness, quality of 
institutions, and public savings as a percent of GDP, and an Africa 
dummy. Despite this parsimonious specification, the regression ex- 
plains 65 percent of the cross-country  variation in growth rates. In 
keeping with most other studies, the coefficients on openness, institu- 
tional quality, and public savings are positive and significant, suggest- 
ing the importance  of economic policy and institutions as factors in 
economic growth.69  Initial income has a negative and significant  coef- 
ficient, suggesting conditional convergence. In the second regression 
69.  See, for example, Barro  (1997); Sachs and Warner  (1995). t  -  or-r  *  o  -  oN  -  N  - 
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we repeat  the exercise but add a measure  of secondary  schooling. The 
schooling coefficient is positive but  not very well determined.  The other 
coefficients  remain  significant  and  of about  the same  order  of magnitude 
as in the first column. However, the schooling variable reduces the 
sample size by eight countries, because of limited data availability. In 
view of its marginal  significance, therefore, and its even lesser statis- 
tical significance  in other specifications  not reported  here, we hereafter 
drop the schooling variable in order to maintain our sample size at 
seventy-seven countries.70 
Despite the considerable  explanatory  power of the policy variables, 
the Africa dummy  variable  is negative and  highly significant  in the first 
and second columns. In the latter, the coefficient suggests that, other 
things  equal, income per  capita  grew 2. 1 percentage  points  more  slowly 
in African economies than in non-African  economies over the period 
1965-9O.71  This result is consistent  with other  studies  and  suggests that 
some influences  on growth  not captured  in the specification  are opera- 
tive in Africa.72  Accordingly, some researchers  argue  that  special social 
characteristics,  such as ethnolinguistic  heterogeneity  and stocks of so- 
cial capital, may be key "missing factors" in Africa's poor growth 
performance.73 
In the third column, we augment  the parsimonious  regression with 
geography and demography  (including health) variables. We control 
for changing  age structure  as described  in the previous  section. We also 
enter  three  geographic  variables:  the percentage  of a country's  land  area 
in the tropics;  the logarithm  of the density of population  within 100 km 
of the coast; and the logarithm  of population  density in the interior, 
further  than 100 km from  the coast. If the entire  population  lives further 
than 100 km from  the coast, the coastal density  variable  is given a value 
70.  Pritchett  (1996) also finds evidence that the direct effect of schooling on eco- 
nomic growth  is insignificant.  By contrast,  Benhabib  and Spiegel (1994) find a signifi- 
cant positive association. 
71.  We have also conducted  an F test to examine whether  the coefficient estimates 
for African economies are equal to those for non-African  economies except for the 
intercept.  The resulting  statistic, based on the regression  reported  in the second column 
of table 6, accepts the hypothesis  of common  parameters-a result  echoed by Easterly 
and  Levine (1997). This finding  suggests that  Africa's slow growth  is due to differences 
in fixed effects and the level of model variables,  not to differences  between  parameters 
for Africa and for the rest of the world. 
72.  Barro  (1991); Easterly  and Levine (1997); Temple (1998). 
73.  See Easterly  and Levine (1997); Temple (1998); Collier and Gunning  (1999). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  259 
of zero. Similarly, if the whole population  lives within lOOkm  of the 
coast, the interior  density variable  is assigned a value of zero.74  Based 
on the discussion above, we expect that  proximity  of the population  to 
the coast will be positively related to economic growth, while high 
population  densities away from the coast will not be strongly  related  to 
growth, and may even have a negative effect. 
Including  these variables  in the empirical  specification  eliminates  the 
negative sign on the Africa dummy  and also its statistical  significance. 
This result suggests that  the augmented  specification  better  captures  the 
fundamental  processes  underlying  economic growth,  both  in Africa  and 
elsewhere. Note also that the coefficients on life expectancy, the age 
structure  variables, and the coastal population  density all have the ex- 
pected signs and are statistically significant. The interior population 
density is negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on 
tropical coverage is negative and highly significant. In the fourth  col- 
umn we add the schooling variable  to this augmented  specification, to 
confirm  that  it is statistically  insignificant  and  does not play any decisive 
role in Africa's growth shortfall. 
In the fifth column we run the basic specification once more, this 
time constraining  the coefficients on the two population  growth varia- 
bles, total population  and working-age  population, to be of equal and 
opposite sign. This constraint  is not rejected  in a formal  F test for the 
equality  of the two coefficients. The regression  estimates  show that  the 
policy variables  (openness, budget  deficit, and quality of institutions), 
geography  variables  (tropical  land  area  and  coastal  population  density), 
and  demographic  variables  (life expectancy  and  population  growth)  are 
all statistically  significant. 
The sixth and seventh columns of table 6 estimate  growth  equations 
for the eighteen African and the fifty-five non-African  countries  in our 
sample, respectively. The specifcation is the same as in the fifth col- 
umn. Notwithstanding  some differences  between  the two equations  that 
presumably  reflect  the small size of the Africa  sample  and  the low extent 
of variation  in some of the key variables  such as tropical  land area  and 
openness of the economy, F tests do not permit rejection of the null 
hypothesis  of common  regression  coefficients between the African  and 
74.  Note that  to account  for these special  cases, we in fact measure  In  (1 + density), 
so that  the value equals zero when density equals zero. 260  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
non-African  countries. The implication  of this result is that economic 
growth is slow in Africa because the continent  lacks favorable values 
for the factors  that  determine  steady-state  growth  in all countries,  rather 
than because those characteristics  are rewarded  less generously in Af- 
rica than elsewhere.75 
Based on these estimates, table 7 decomposes  the sources  of Africa's 
growth gap with East and Southeast  Asia, Latin America and the Ca- 
ribbean,  and  the non-African  world generally  over the period 1965-90, 
using the fifth  regression  from  table 6. After controlling  for differential 
rates of growth due to differences in initial income, Africa's rate of 
growth  is 4.9 percentage  points slower than that  of East and Southeast 
Asia, 2.3 percentage  points slower than  that  of Latin  America, and 3.7 
percentage  points slower than that of the rest of the world generally. 
The table highlights the direct contributions  of age structure, geog- 
raphy, and health as proximate  factors explaining Africa's relatively 
poor growth  performance.  The combined  effects of these three factors 
account for 73 percent of the gap with East and Southeast  Asia,  103 
percent  of the gap with Latin America, and 78 percent  of the gap with 
the non-African  world. 
These estimates do not account for influences of demography  and 
geography  that  may operate  indirectly  through  other  included  variables. 
For example, rapid  population  growth  and disadvantageous  geography 
may create enormous barriers  to good governance. Although a full 
decomposition  of these and other possible channels awaits further  re- 
search, these initial results are highly suggestive.76  By far the biggest 
75.  The eighteen  countries  in the Africa sample  comprise  those for which all of the 
requisite  data  are available. However, this group  represents  only about  two-fifths  of all 
fifty-five countries in sub-Saharan  Africa (including Eritrea, Madagascar,  Mauritius, 
and the Seychelles) and just less than one-half of the forty-one sub-Saharan  African 
countries  for which we have any data.  Comparison  of the African  countries  in our  dataset 
with the omitted  countries  on selected  variables  for which  we do have  information  reveals 
that  our sample is representative  of sub-Saharan  Africa in terms  of growth  rates  of total 
and working-age populations, growth rates of income per capita, openness to trade, 
liquidity, quality  of institutions,  and  tropical  coverage. By contrast,  the countries  in our 
sample  tend  to have higher  initial  income, higher  coastal  and  inland  population  densities, 
and lower ratios  of coastline to land area. 
76.  Bloom and Williamson  (1999) find  that  youth  dependency  has a greater  negative 
effect on economic growth  than  elderly  dependency.  Since youth  dependency  dominates 
the overall dependency  burden  in Africa much more than in other  regions, an analysis 
that took into account the growth rates of different segments of the age distribution 0  3 
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effects are from demography  and life expectancy. The tropics effect is 
especially small in the comparisons with Asia and Latin America, 
mainly because the comparison  groups  are also heavily tropical. Rela- 
tive to a temperate  zone economy, the absolute  size of the tropics  effect 
is actually quite large: a point estimate of 1.13 percentage  points per 
year in slower economic growth. 
Among the policy variables, much the most important  is Africa's 
lack of openness to international  trade.77  Almost all postindependence 
African governments  adopted  autarkic  trade  policies, with the goal of 
achieving industrialization  through  import substitution.  As elsewhere 
in the world, that  strategy  failed decisively, both because  local markets 
were far too small to support  efficient and competitive industry and 
because export growth  was needed to support  imports  of capital goods 
and intermediate  products.  The result  was a serious negative impact  on 
economic growth, estimated at 1.2 percent  per year (or 32 percent of 
the total gap) in comparison  with East Asia, where more open trade 
policies were pursued.78 
A number  of recent studies evaluate the sources of slow growth in 
Africa  using panel  data.79  With  respect  to Africa, some argue  that  cross- 
country studies do not account for the dramatic  slowdown in growth 
since  1973.80  We have constructed a panel dataset and conducted some 
basic analyses, following a core specification  similar  to that  of William 
Easterly and Ross Levine with the addition of variables measuring 
changes in age structure  and  geo-climatic  conditions.81  Our  conclusions 
are similar to those based on the cross-sectional  analyses. We do find, 
however, that the magnitude-but  not the statistical significance-of 
the contribution  of demography,  health, and geo-climatic conditions  is 
sensitive to the inclusion of infrastructure  variables  (that  is, the natural 
would likely indicate  an even more  important  role for demography.  See the appendix  to 
Bloom and Malaney  (1998) for a discussion  of the relevant  models. 
77.  The comparisons  with Latin  America  are between  closed economies. 
78.  More generally, the failure  of import  substitution  policies also left these coun- 
tries vulnerable  to macroeconomic  upheaval;  see Sachs and Warner  (1995, 1997). 
79.  See, for example, Easterly  and Levine (1997); Temple (1998); Islam (1996). 
80.  Collier and  Gunning  (1999). Growth  apparently  declined at an accelerating  rate; 
population-weighted  per capita growth  averaged 1.5 percent  in the 1960s, 0.8 percent 
in the 1970s, -  1.2 percent  in the 1980s, and  (using data  from  World  Bank, 1998) -0.9 
percent  over 1990-96. 
81.  Easterly  and Levine (1997). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  263 
logarithm  of telephones  per  working-age  person).  This is not surprising, 
given the discussion above of the links between geography and the 
provision of infrastructure.  Africa's poor infrastructure  may in large 
measure  reflect geographic  realities:  low population  densities and pop- 
ulations living far from coastal regions, where infrastructure  invest- 
ments are presumably  cheaper  and more efficient. 
The cross-country  and  panel data  estimates  highlight  the importance 
of a similar  set of factors  to economic  growth.  Policy, education,  and  the 
role of initial income have received significant  attention  in the growth 
literature;  age structure,  health conditions  and their ecological determi- 
nants, and geography  have received  much less. Yet these factors  reflect 
significant  aspects  of Africa's fundamental  conditions  and are estimated 
to account  for a sizable  share-70  to 100 percent,  depending  on the point 
of comparison  (see table  7)-of  Africa's  extremely  slow growth. 
Overcoming Africa's Structural Barriers to Growth 
African economies remain characterized  by very low levels of in- 
come, high proportions  of the population  engaged in agriculture,  urban 
areas  that  function  as political and administrative  centers  rather  than  as 
exporting  regions, and  very limited international  trade,  concentrated  in 
a narrow  range of primary  commodities. Given these realities, and the 
geographic  and demographic  factors that underlie  them, what kinds of 
growth  strategies  might be effective? 
Just as we started  our analysis by placing Africa within the general 
development  context of tropical  economies, one can also examine the 
success stories of growth among tropical economies for lessons they 
may hold for Africa. To be sure, there have been precious few suc- 
cesses. Within tropical Africa, there are only two unambiguous  long- 
term  candidates:  Botswana  and Mauritius.  Botswana's case is not gen- 
erally replicable, since its success has depended  on a very small desert 
population  enjoying  the benefits  of large and  well-managed  discoveries 
of diamonds-although  one should note that Botswana has used its 
resources  effectively: trade  policy has remained  open, democracy  has 
been  vigorous  and  stable, and  fiscal  policy has been prudently  managed. 
Mauritius  is more apposite, as a typical tropical agricultural  exporter 
(mainly  of sugar  cane) that  has succeeded in export-led  growth  in man- 264  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
ufactures and services. Outside the African region, the only tropical 
developing countries that averaged more than 3.0 percent per year in 
per capita GDP growth during 1965-96 are in Asia: Hong Kong (5.6 
percent), Indonesia (4.6 percent), Malaysia (4.1 percent), Sri Lanka 
(3.1 percent), Singapore (6.3 percent), and Thailand  (5.0 percent).82 
Much has been written about these economies-especially  since they 
are also currently  embroiled  in financial  upheaval;  it is therefore  pos- 
sible to identify some of the key factors of their success that might be 
relevant  to a strategy  for renewed African growth strategy. 
Most important,  the core of the Asian countries'  growth  strategy  was 
an industrial  policy that aimed to promote  manufacturing,  and increas- 
ingly service sector, exports.83  These countries  not only aimed to in- 
crease export growth, but to diversify away from their traditional  de- 
pendence on tropical commodities in order to benefit from the much 
more rapid growth in world trade  in manufactures  and services. They 
recognized that agricultural  exports would lack dynamism, not only 
because of limits to the growth of world demand  but also due to tech- 
nological limits to the expansion of production. As many observers 
have noted, success in manufacturing  export-led  growth  was not just a 
function of market  forces. It also required  the introduction  of key in- 
stitutions,  designed  to link domestic  labor-intensive  manufacturing  pro- 
duction with world markets. Thus Southeast Asian countries made 
novel institutional  arrangements  with multinational  firms to facilitate 
the outsourcing  of labor-intensive  operations  to the local economies. 
Such arrangements  included export processing zones, in which infra- 
structure  and  customs administration  were set up to reduce  transactions 
costs for multinational  enterprises  and  industrial  parks  were established 
for export-oriented  production;  duty drawbacks  on tariffs on raw ma- 
terials and capital goods imported  for export production;  generous  tax 
holidays for export-oriented  foreign investors; and flexibility in labor 
markets. The strategy  was essentially passed on from one location to 
the next. Hong Kong was first  to adopt  the approach,  in the 1950s, and 
was emulated  by Korea and Taiwan in the early to mid-1960s. Singa- 
pore adopted  the export-led  manufacturing  model around  1967. In 1971 
Malaysia established Penang Island as an export processing zone in 
82.  Asian growth  rates are based on World  Bank (1998). 
83.  See Radelet, Sachs, and Lee (1997) for a more  complete  discussion. David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  265 
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emulation of Singapore.  In the 1980s Thailand and Indonesia began to 
promote similar manufacturing export schemes.  And in the early 1990s 
the Philippines  adopted the approach, focusing  in particular on export- 
oriented consumer electronics. 
The pattern of export growth in the rapidly growing export-oriented 
Asian countries  stands in sharp contrast to the performance of Africa, 
which remained overwhelmingly  tied to primary commodities,  except 
for Mauritius and, to a small extent,  South Africa.  In fact,  Mauritius 
adopted  the  export  processing  zone  model  in  1971,  in emulation  of 
Taiwan.84 Figure 8 presents primary commodity exports as a proportion 
of  total  exports  by  region,  over  the  period  1980-96.  It  shows  that 
tropical Africa (excluding  Mauritius and Madagascar) has had close  to 
100 percent concentration of exports in primary commodities  and has 
84.  In Mauritius,  export  firms  were not required  to establish  operations  within spe- 
cial industrial  parks  in order  to qualify for export processing zone-type privileges on 
taxes and customs  and other  export  incentives. 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
experienced  little change in commodity  dependence  between 1980 and 
1996. Latin  America  is the second most commodity-dependent  region, 
but it experienced  a rather  sizable shift toward  manufactures.  Although 
the developing countries  of East Asia were already  largely in manufac- 
turing  by 1980, they did experience an increased  proportion  of manu- 
factures  in total exports  between 1980 and 1996. The six fast-growing 
Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka,  and  Thailand)  and  Mauritius,  as a group,  also had  a steep decline 
in the share  of commodities in total exports. 
Perhaps  the most striking  example of Africa's absence from manu- 
factures trade is the textiles and apparel sector, which has produced 
labor-intensive  exports in virtually all parts of the developing world. 
Other than Mauritius and (very recently) Madagascar  in the Indian 
Ocean, and the North African countries  of Egypt, Morocco, and Tun- 
isia, African  countries  play virtually  no role in textile and  apparel  trade; 
only Kenya and Zimbabwe  have even minuscule  apparel  exports, add- 
ing up to a mere 0.05 percent  of global trade.85 
Was there really an advantage  to manufacturing  export-led growth 
over commodity export-led growth in this period?  It seems clear that 
the answer is yes. World  demand  for manufactures  rose far faster than 
demand  for primary  commodities:  a cumulative increase in the dollar 
value of manufactures  trade  of 2.7 percent  per year, compared  with an 
average  annual  increase  of 0.65 percent  in world  commodity  trade.  The 
terms  of trade  for commodities  producers  declined significantly  during 
the period, as shown by the terms of trade of African economies in 
figure 9.  Moreover, table 8 shows that Africa suffered an absolute 
decline in the dollar value of per capita export earnings, in contrast  to 
the significant  increases in total earning  per capita in other regions of 
the world. If it is true that the manufacturing  sector enjoys faster pro- 
ductivity  growth  than  primary  commodities, why does the rising supply 
of manufactures  relative to primary  commodities not lead to a decline 
in the relative price of manufactures?  A large part  of the answer  is that 
manufacturing  growth involves not only growth in volumes, but also 
growth in varieties, which is much faster than the growth in varieties 
of primary  commodities. Thus manufacturers  can find niches in new 
85.  Estimates  by the Harvard  Institute  for International  Development,  based  on data 
from the U.S. Trade  Commission;  see HIID and World  Economic Forum  (1998, table 
4, p. 40). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  267 
Figure 9. Terms  of Trade  of African Economies,  1980-95 
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product  lines in which the terms  of trade  remain  strong, even as overall 
manufacturing  supply rises much faster than primary  commodity sup- 
ply. And there are other possible answers  as well.86 
Can Africa Diversify  Its Exports? 
Our  main  conjecture  is that  manufacturing  and  service sector  export- 
led growth  would benefit Africa not only as an outlet for new exports, 
but as a way to address some (though not all) of its geographical  lia- 
bilities. In essence, we are surmising  that  at a general  level, Africa and 
many other tropical environments  have a true comparative  advantage 
86.  Part  of the story may simply lie in price measurement.  Quality  improvements  in 
manufacturing  goods are probably  understated  in price indexes, so that  price rises over 
time are probably  overstated.  This would tend to exaggerate  measured  increases  in the 
terms of trade of manufactures  vis-a-vis commodities. Two other frequently  argued 
propositions  are that the income elasticity of demand  is less for primary  commodities 
than for manufactures,  and that technical change saves on primary  resources, such as 
when fiber  optic cables replace  copper  wires, or synthetic  rubbers  substitute  for natural 
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Table  8. Nominal  Value  of Exports Per Capita by Region, 1980 and 1996 
U.S. dollars 
Region  1980  1996  Ratio,  1996/1980 
Tropical  continental  Africa  130  70  0.5 
East  and  Southeast  Asia  144  472  3.3 
Latin  America  260  509  2.0 
Fast-growing  economiesa  361  1,611  4.5 
Source: Statistics Canada (1997),  World Bank (1998) 
a  Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
in manufactures  and services, despite having been viewed for centuries 
as suppliers  of primary  commodities. While there will surely remain  a 
significant  niche for a range  of agricultural  goods endemic  to the tropics 
(such as coffee, tea, cocoa), it may simply be a matter  of comparative 
advantage-especially  influenced  by the low productivity  of food pro- 
duction in the continent-that  Africa should be a net importer  of agri- 
cultural commodities (mainly foodstuffs), paid for by net exports of 
manufactures  and services, as well as traditional  resource  exports. 
Admittedly, the continent  as a whole could not follow such a strat- 
egy. Successful export-led growth in manufactures  in low-wage, low- 
skilled countries  requires  low transport  costs, especially because man- 
ufacturing  processes tend to involve a significant  import  component  of 
final output. In the export processing zones in the Philippines, for 
example, the cost of imported  inputs are 60 percent  of the FOB value 
of electronics exports.87  Even slight increases in transport  costs on 
imported  inputs  can easily wipe out all domestic  profits.  For  this reason, 
the success stories in manufacturing  export-led growth are almost all 
coastal economies, well connected to international  shipping routes. 
Thus  in Africa, a manufacturing  export-led  growth  strategy  would  prob- 
ably be most effective in the large urban  areas on the east and west 
coasts, such as Abidjan, Accra, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, Maputo, and 
Mombasa. Currently,  these port cities play almost no role as export- 
oriented  manufacturing  centers. An urban-based  export strategy  would 
have other  obvious advantages  as well. Infrastructure  provision  is con- 
siderably  less costly in the more densely populated  urban  setting, and 
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the transmission  of vector-borne  diseases, such as malaria, is often 
easier to moderate  in an urban  environment.88 
Inland countries inherently  face high transport  costs for imported 
intermediate  items. It is therefore  likely that  their success in manufac- 
turing  export growth  will depend on the extent to which they increase 
processing of  locally produced commodities. For example, Uganda 
could sell roasted and branded  coffee,  rather  than raw beans; while 
Mali, Uganda, and other cotton producers  could become competitive 
textile exporters  (as Uganda was on a very modest scale thirty years 
ago). In addition, all parts  of Africa have at least some potential  in the 
service sector, especially in tourism, and also in several kinds of data 
transmission  and  data  processing  operations,  such a; data  transcription 
and back-office services, which can be outsourced  to low-wage coun- 
tries via telephone and internet  connections. 
Export  success does not emerge automatically  as the result of com- 
parative  advantage  based on relative factor costs. Competitiveness  in 
labor-intensive  manufacturing  exports requires  the following: 
-effective  logistical operations at the port and low-cost internal 
transport  to port facilities; 
-duty-free  access to imported  inputs and capital goods; 
-timely  customs administration; 
-physical  security and reliability in warehousing; 
-cost-effective  access to international  telephone and internet  ser- 
vices; 
-reliable  power supply; 
-flexibility  in hiring and dismissing workers; 
-low  (or zero) taxation on multinational  income, at least to be 
competitive  with alternative  production  sites; and 
-reasonable  shipping costs to major ports in Europe, the United 
States, and Japan. 
The list is straightforward;  the achievement of competitiveness is 
not. As in Michael Kremer's "O-ring" theory of development, the 
88.  Urban  centers  can be inhospitable  breeding  grounds  for Anopheles  mosquitoes, 
which  require  clean  water  sites for larval  development  and  are  typically  stifled  in polluted 
urban settings. Unfortunately,  the tropical urban areas at low altitude in Africa are 
generally  malarial,  but disease transmission  is less stable, and therefore  there may be 
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process can break  down at its weakest link.89  In much of urban  coastal 
Africa, the development  of export-oriented  manufacturing  is frustrated 
by poor port services,  unreliable power supplies, abusive customs 
agents, duties on imported  intermediate  inputs,  or lack of tax holidays.90 
Despite more than a decade of structural  adjustment  lending by the 
IMF and  World  Bank  throughout  Africa, very little structural  change is 
actually taking place in exports and production.  Why these programs 
have not promoted export diversification  and dynamism is an open, 
empirical question. Our hypothesis is that the programs  are not suffi- 
ciently focused on the nitty-gritty  work of overcoming the practical 
obstacles to international  manufacturing  competitiveness. Moreover, 
practical  policy advice  from  these institutions-for  example, their  long- 
standing ambivalence or outright opposition to the establishment  of 
export  processing  zones and  their  frequent  opposition  to tax concessions 
aimed at attracting  export-oriented  manufactures-is  often in direct 
conflict with the diversification  of exports. 
The real sources of Africa's lack of competitiveness  in manufactur- 
ing exports  are  not well understood.  Researchers  have as yet undertaken 
very little systematic comparison  of African economies with other re- 
gions regarding  factor costs, transport  costs, tax arrangements,  infra- 
structure  availability, and the like. This basic fact finding should be 
made a high priority. 
Conclusion 
The central  objective of this paper  is to highlight some deep under- 
lying factors that have hindered African economic growth, not only 
over the past three decades, but for the entire period of modern  eco- 
nomic growth. Identifying these factors and the mechanisms  through 
which they influence  growth  is a vital step in developing strategies  for 
achieving higher growth rates in Africa. Perhaps  our most important 
89.  Kremer  (1993). 
90.  Tanzania  recently  attracted  a Korean  apparel  firm  that  was successfully produc- 
ing and exporting  clothing for the U.S. market.  The U.S. customer  subsequently  can- 
celled the contract, however, because of excessive shipping  delays due to obstruction 
and  hassles by port  and  customs  authorities.  (Personal  communication  with  the economic 
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finding is  that economic policy and governance, which receive the 
largest share of economists' attention, are perhaps  not the dominant 
factors impeding  economic growth  in Africa. Rather,  we find that var- 
ious aspects of tropical  geography,  demography,  and public health are 
vitally important,  and we argue  that causality runs strongly  from these 
factors to growth, rather  than vice versa (although  some reverse feed- 
backs exist as well).  Our statistical estimates, admittedly  imprecise, 
actually  give about  two-thirds  of the weight of Africa's growth  shortfall 
to such "noneconomic" conditions and only one-third to economic 
policy and institutions. This does not mean that economic policy is 
unimportant.  Indeed, good policies are especially important,  because 
economic growth  will otherwise  be so hard  to achieve. 
Our findings suggest that economists ought to lift their gaze above 
macroeconomic  policies and market  liberalization, in order  to deepen 
their understanding  of the linkages between the physical environment 
and  social outcomes. The complex interplay  among  geography,  demog- 
raphy,  health, and  economic performance  surely requires  intensive and 
systematic examination. For the sake of development  in Africa, there 
needs to be much greater  cross-fertilization  between fields such as de- 
mography, epidemiology, agronomy, ecology,  geography, and eco- 
nomics. In short, there is a need for better tools in an area of study 
perhaps  best termed  human  ecology, which places social activity and 
economic development more firmly in the context of the physical 
environment. 
Given this enormous intellectual challenge, Africa surely suffers 
from a remarkable  lack of attention from the international  scientific 
community  in regard  to health, agricultural,  and environmental  prob- 
lems. Many  able  scientists  in Africa  and  elsewhere  are  pursuing  relevant 
basic and applied  research, but their efforts do not match the scale of 
the problems.  Many  of the issues-for  example, designing an effective 
campaign  against  malaria,  and developing better  understandings  of the 
virology and  epidemiology  of AIDS in Africa, the interaction  of climate 
and low life expectancy, and tropical forestry and the adaptation  of 
food production  to tropical  conditions-are  international  public goods. 
Scientific research  on these topics will naturally  be underprovided  by 
private  markets  and even by the efforts of individual  nations. For ex- 
ample, on a per fatality  basis, global expenditures  on malaria  research 
are roughly  one-twelfth  of those on asthma  research  and one-fiftieth  of 272  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1998 
those on HIV/AIDS research (mainly because AIDS is such a huge 
problem  in industrial  countries).91  The decline in financial  support  for 
the Consultative Group for International  Agricultural  Research-the 
main global network supporting  agricultural  research appropriate  to 
conditions in developing countries-bodes  ill for innovation in agri- 
culture and animal husbandry  in Africa. New ways also have to be 
found to bring in private sector research  efforts for vaccine develop- 
ment, biotechnology research, and other areas. At least part of the 
financing  for reinvigorating  scientific effort on behalf of Africa should 
probably  come from redirecting  aid programs  away from standard  pol- 
icy-based lending and toward the underlying scientific and technical 
problems. 
Africa was the only major region in the world to experience an 
absolute  decline in export  earnings  per person  between 1980 and 1996. 
This is not only a vivid illustration  of its marginalization  in the world 
economy, but also a proximate  cause of Africa's slow growth, since it 
has lacked the foreign exchange earnings needed to invest heavily in 
capital goods from abroad.  It seems clear, therefore,  that  Africa's eco- 
nomic development will require a major commitment  to policies and 
institutions  that  promote  manufactured  exports. Such an approach  was 
key to the economic growth of many tropical countries in East and 
Southeast Asia.  While general points of economic reform, such as 
macroeconomic  stability, currency  convertibility,  and  low inflation  are 
important  in this regard, they are not enough. International  competi- 
tiveness in manufactures  requires  a set of effective institutions  (often 
mediated  by multinational  enterprises)  linking the domestic economy 
with world markets. These have not been fostered adequately  by the 
World Bank and IMF programs  of recent years; more direct focus on 
export diversification and manufacturing  sector competitiveness is 
needed. Most of the major  coastal port cities of East and West Africa 
are candidates for a greatly expanded role in export-led growth. In 
addition, creative  effort is needed to promote  investment  in infrastruc- 
ture. However, one important  lesson of recent  development  experience 
in other parts of the world is that infrastructure  can increasingly be 
financed  privately and in a competitive market  setting, rather  than by 
cash-strapped  state monopolies, as has traditionally  been the case in 
91.  Anderson,  MacLean,  and Davies (1996, table 2.3, p. 29). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  273 
Africa. The rapid  urbanization  that  Africa  is currently  experiencing  will 
enhance this process by allowing private  entrepreneurs  to benefit from 
greater  economies of scale in densely populated  urban  areas. 
Africa  is the largest  and  most complex development  challenge  facing 
the world today. And many of the factors that contribute  to Africa's 
apparent  growth  trap  continue  unabated  or may even be tightening  their 
hold. On  the one hand,  pockets  of improvement  in health  and  education, 
the incipient decline of fertility in some countries, and growth of the 
world economy provide some hope that this challenge will be success- 
fully confronted.  On the other  hand, rapid  population  growth, environ- 
mental  stresses, and  the AIDS epidemic are enormously  disconcerting. 
Based on the results presented here, it appears  that economists and 
donors must reorient their efforts more toward the roles played by 
geography,  demography,  and health in Africa's growth  crisis, in order 
to devise more effective approaches  to alleviating the human misery 
that continues to pervade  the continent. Comments 
and Discussion 
Paul Collier: One of the quests of recent growth  research  has been to 
explain why Africa has grown  so slowly.  ' In simple growth  regressions 
there is a significant  negative Africa dummy:  Africa just grows unac- 
countably slowly. There are two new structural  explanations  for this 
lack of growth. 
First, David Bloom and  Jeffrey  Sachs  propose  in this insightful  paper 
that Africa is locationally disadvantaged.  It is tropical, and so suffers 
from diseases such as malaria,  and  most of its population  lives far from 
the coast. Both the presence of malaria  and being landlocked  are iso- 
lating, and isolation is the main cause of slow growth. A corollary is 
that Africa's deficiencies in policy and institutions have been over- 
played: the authors  attribute  60 to 90 percent  of Africa's slow growth 
to geography  and demography. 
Bloom and Sachs are dismissive  of a second prominent  structural  ex- 
planation,  that  of Easterly  and Levine, who argue  that  Africa's problem 
is its high ethnic  diversity.2 The median  African  country  has more than 
double  the diversity  of the median  non-African  developing  country.  Just 
as Sachs  and  Warner  find  location  to be significant  in a growth  regression, 
so Easterly  and  Levine find  ethnic  diversity  to be significant.3 
Although  both of these explanations  allow some role for policy, they 
see it as endogenous. Gallup  and  Sachs argue  that  countries  isolated  by 
1. The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in this paper  are entirely 
those of the author  and do not necessarily  represent  the views of the World Bank, its 
executive directors,  or the countries  they represent. 
2.  Easterly  and Levine (1997). 
3.  Sachs and Warner  (1997). 
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location will have weaker lobbies in favor of trade, so that exogenous 
isolation  will be compounded  by policy-induced  isolation.4  Easterly  and 
Levine argue that ethnic diversity makes cooperation more difficult, 
which leads to worse policies. 
These explanations  need not be alternatives:  they could both  be right. 
However, they are both seriously overplayed. I think that Sachs is 
correct in identifying tropical  and landlocked  locations as disadvanta- 
geous, but this knowledge is not central  to understanding  African  eco- 
nomic performance.  Bloom and Sachs, following Sachs and Warner, 
build a regression  including  locational variables, which gets rid of the 
significant  Africa dummy.5  However, at least in the Sachs and Warner 
version, this has nothing  to do with the locational  variables:  if one runs 
the regressions  without them, the Africa dummy  is still insignificant.6 
In addition, location is the ultimate fixed effect.  Simple ordinary 
least squares regressions of the average growth rate over twenty-five 
years, as used by Sachs with Bloom and Warner,  are not the best way 
of testing for such an effect-for  that, one needs panels. Bloom and 
Sachs mention, but do not report, panel data results that support  their 
findings. However, the only panel data  work on Africa that  I have seen 
is that  of Anke Hoeffler, who finds the opposite.7  Dividing thirty  years 
into a panel of five-year  averages  and using system GMM (generalized 
moments  of the mean) estimation, she tests for Africa fixed effects in 
the standard  Solow growth  model. The coefficient  on the Africa  dummy 
is small and insignificant:  there are no African  fixed effects to explain, 
and so African  location cannot be very important. 
I agree  that  Africa's high population  growth  rate has been costly for 
per capita growth, but this may well be largely endogenous to poor 
economic performance.  If parents saw prospects of growth in wage 
employment, they would have an interest in investing in educational 
quality, and thus would find large families uneconomic. 
Finally, Africa now has a large offsetting positive against  the nega- 
tives of being tropical and landlocked: it is poor. One knows from 
conditional  convergence  that, for given policies, poor countries grow 
more  quickly. Africa's growth  bonus from this catch-up  effect is larger 
4.  Gallup  and Sachs (1999). 
5.  Sachs and  Warner  (1997). 
6.  These results  come from my doctoral  student  Anke Hoeffler. 
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than  its losses from location. In the long run, as Africa narrows  the gap 
with other regions, the catch-up  effect will be spent, leaving the loca- 
tional  negatives:  Africa  will converge  to a lower income level than  were 
it better located. However, this long run is irrelevant.  Africa has the 
scope for several  decades of catch-up  growth.  Before that  is exhausted, 
the economics of tropical, landlocked  locations  will probably  have been 
transformed  by vaccines and airplanes. 
In short, I question  that  a large  majority  of Africa's growth  problems 
come from geography  rather  than policy. Further  econometric  work is 
needed, but on balance, current  African nonpolicy fundamentals  are 
probably  conducive to growth. 
Policy as destiny. Africa has suffered a growth  failure, but this has 
not been due to fixed effects. It has been determined  by policy, which 
has changed considerably  over the past forty years. Further,  levels of 
growth  currently  vary greatly across the continent. 
During the 1960s, growth was quite reasonable:  output  per worker 
grew at the same rate of around  2 percent in Africa and South Asia. 
Over the next two decades there was a policy collapse; as a result, 
growth collapsed. Whereas in South Asia the growth of output per 
worker  accelerated  to 2.6 percent, in Africa it declined to 0.6 percent.8 
During the 1990s, Africa has become differentiated  by policy. The 
World Bank has just completed a standardized  policy rating  for all its 
clients. Measured  across twenty different aspects, policy in Africa re- 
mains, on average, worse than in any of the other five regions of the 
world. However, whereas  a decade  ago there  was little policy dispersion 
within the continent, now there is more than in any of the other five 
regions:  the coefficient  of variation  of the African  policy ratings  is about 
double that of the other regions. There are good policy environments 
in Africa, as well as some very bad ones. The bottom  five countries  on 
the policy scale are all African. Nevertheless, twelve low-income Af- 
rican countries-accounting  for 26 percent  of the low-income popula- 
tion of Africa-had  achieved  broadly  satisfactory  policy environments 
by 1995. The post-1995 growth  rate  of output  per worker  in this aggre- 
gate has been 4.7 percent  per year-hardly  cause for despondency. 
Policy might matter,  but Gallup and Sachs counter  that it is endog- 
enous to geography:  landlocked  countries  have less incentive to adopt 
8.  Collins and Bosworth  (1996). David E. Bloom and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  277 
good policies.9 This is an attractive  analytic speculation and globally 
there is some evidence for it, but it happens  not to be true in present- 
day Africa. All five of the worst policy environments  on the World 
Bank's ratings  are  coastal, but among  the 26 percent  of the low-income 
population  living in adequate  policy environments,  two-thirds  are  land- 
locked. 
Easterly  and Levine develop an alternative  explanation  for why Af- 
rican policies are, on average, poor: high ethnic diversity makes co- 
operation difficult, and in the limit, may be the cause of the high 
incidence  of conflict.  '0 Here I disagree  both with the argument  and  with 
the Bloom and Sachs critique. Africa's problem  has not been the high 
level of ethnic diversity, but the low level of political rights in the 
context of that diversity. When the interaction  of ethnic diversity and 
political rights is included in a growth  regression, it is the most signif- 
icant variable, and any remaining  effects of diversity become insignif- 
icant. Ethnically  diverse societies need democracy  much more than  do 
homogenous societies.  Among diverse societies,  democracies grow 
3 percent  per year more rapidly  than  dictatorships,  whereas  in homog- 
enous societies political rights have no effect on the growth  rate.  11 
Until recently, Africa  had astonishingly  low levels of political rights. 
It was Africa's misfortune that decolonization led to dictatorship  in 
societies for which dictatorship  was economically ruinous:  decoloni- 
zation empowered  narrow  interest  groups  that it has taken  a generation 
to dislodge. In a recent study, I compare  the median African country 
with the median  non-African  developing country.  12 I measure  political 
rights by the Gastil index, where full democracy rates as 1 and full 
dictatorship rates as 7.  Averaged over  1973-90,  Africa scores 6, 
whereas  other developing countries score 4. For the median country, 
the implied  loss of growth  caused by this conjunction  of low rights and 
high ethnic diversity is around  1.5 percent  per year, which is about  the 
magnitude  of Africa's underperformance. 
Nor is high ethnic diversity an explanation  for the high incidence of 
civil war in Africa. Globally, the peak danger of civil war occurs at 
fairly low levels of diversity:  essentially, when the country  consists of 
9.  Gallup  and Sachs (1999). 
10. Easterly  and Levine (1997). 
11. Collier  (1999). 
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two groups. Highly diverse societies are in fact safer than  homogenous 
societies. The predominant  causes of civil war are poverty and lack of 
political rights:  poor youths have little to lose from  joining rebellions, 
and in the absence of voting rights  there  are no alternative  channels  for 
registering  allegiance and influencing  policy. Africa's high incidence 
of civil war is fully explained  by its poverty.  13 
Which policies  are  destiny?  From  their  emphasis  on  geography, 
Bloom and Sachs draw the important  inference that Africa lacks a 
comparative  advantage  in agriculture  and must seek its future  in man- 
ufacturing. This  is  the  antithesis of  Adrian Wood and coauthors 
Kristi Berger and Jorg Mayer, who argue that Africa's abundance  of 
land precludes a manufacturing  future.14  In this instance I agree with 
Bloom and Sachs, though for somewhat different reasons. Africa's 
decline has so reduced real incomes that, despite its natural  resource 
exports, its labor costs should be competitive. Africa is currently  un- 
competitive in manufacturing  not because of its endowments, but be- 
cause of its policies. 
I agree with Bloom and Sachs on the centrality  of openness. African 
governments  have created  barriers  to openness  partly  through  trade  and 
exchange  rate  policies, and  partly  by neglecting  transport  infrastructure. 
Not only has the typical African country  been more closed than other 
countries, but a given level of restrictions  is more  costly in Africa than 
elsewhere. For example, an exchange rate distortion  of a given mag- 
nitude is almost twice as damaging  to growth in Africa.  15  I think that 
this is partly because Africa's economies are so small. As a result, 
exposure to trade  is essential both for competition and for scale econ- 
omies. Further,  the level of technology is so low that participation  in 
trade  is the best means of knowledge catch-up. 
African  firms  have been handicapped  by at least four  other  important 
constraints-high  costs of power, high transaction  costs, high costs of 
information,  and high levels of risk-all  of which have their roots in 
politics and policy. First, Africa is short  of power. For example, even 
in landlocked Uganda, the constraint  currently  most emphasized by 
firms is not transport  but electricity. Around  a third  of manufacturing 
investment  goes to the purchase  of generators.  The cause of this situa- 
13. Collier and Hoeffler  (1998). 
14. Wood (1997); Wood and Berger  (1997); Wood and Mayer  (1999). 
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tion is political: vested interests  preserve  a highly inefficient state mo- 
nopoly of large-scale  generation,  so that  the majority  of Uganda's  elec- 
tricity is generated  on a small scale for own consumption.  Electricity 
has become part  of the subsistence sector! And this is one of the best 
policy environments  in Africa. At the other end of the spectrum, Ni- 
gerian politics has achieved the remarkable  outcome of domestic fuel 
scarcity in an oil exporter. 
Second, transactions  costs are high because contract  enforcement  is 
weak. This is, again, political: the judiciary is not, de facto, indepen- 
dent. A 1996 survey found that the major  problem  for Ugandan  banks 
was that  due to the malfunctioning  of the courts, assets could not func- 
tion as collateral. When courts are weak, opportunism  thrives, and 
credit is scarce. A survey of Kenyan manufacturing  found that this 
situation priveleged Asian-owned firms, whose dense kin networks 
within the sector provided an alternative  means of determining the 
reliability of contracts. 
Third, information  costs are high primarily  because Africa has the 
worst telephone  system in the world and  until recently  has had a highly 
restricted  press. Once again, this is political: dictators  regard  an open 
telephone  system and unrestrained  media as threats.  Some of the costs 
of a bad telephone system are obvious, others are subtle. An obvious 
cost is that exporting is more difficult: I encountered  a Zimbabwean 
manufacturer  who had to drive for forty minutes in order to make a 
telephone call.  A subtle cost is that by limiting social interaction  it 
reduces trust:  telephone density is highly significant  in explaining in- 
ternational differences in trust. In the Easterly and Levine growth 
regression, Africa's telephone system accounts  for a loss of 1 percent 
per year in growth.  16 
Fourth, investors regard  Africa as the riskiest region in the world. 
Some of this risk is intrinsic to small, commodity-dependent  econo- 
mies. Some risk is a corollary  of trade  barriers  and  high transport  costs: 
because  the timing  of international  deliveries is unreliable,  firms  cannot 
operate  a just-in-time  delivery system. For example, in Zimbabwe  the 
average  manufacturing  firm  carries  two months' stocks of inputs. Some 
risk is a corollary  of unreliable  power supply:  production  is subject to 
frequent  interruptions.  Some risk is a corollary of weak contract  en- 
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forcement:  firms  are unable  to distinguish  opportunism  from  force  ma- 
jeur.  In response, they tend to restrict  their business dealings to estab- 
lished relationships,  making  new entry  more  difficult. Much  of the risk, 
however, is directly political and reflects policy uncertainty.  I think 
that the practice of donor conditionality  has been at fault here: it has 
increased  policy uncertainty  rather  than sustained  policy change. Aid 
does not induce sustained policy change, but it sometimes coerces 
unsustainable  change. For example, the World  Bank  has "bought" the 
same price reform  four times from the government  of Kenya.  17 
Destiny  as  hysteresis.  Trade  barriers,  transport  costs, power costs, 
transactions  costs, information  costs, and  high risk, all largely  the result 
of policy, have long-lasting  effects. While I share  the Bloom and  Sachs 
agenda of trying to make manufacturing  work, I think one should ac- 
knowledge  that  hysteresis  effects of a prolonged  period  of poor policies 
may have made this infeasible. 
First, there has been a loss of capital that may be irrecoverable. 
Trade  barriers,  transport  costs, power costs, transactions  costs, infor- 
mation  costs, and  high risk reduce  the risk-corrected  returns  on African 
capital. On average, the rate of return  on investment in Africa since 
1960 has been around  one-third  lower than elsewhere.'8 Not surpris- 
ingly, this has resulted in both a lack of inward investment and an 
exodus of African wealth. I estimate that by 1990, around  39 percent 
of African  private  wealth was outside the continent, a higher  share  than 
for any other region.  '9 As a result, Africa is now chronically  short of 
private  capital: private  capital stock per worker  has been falling since 
1980 and is now less than  half that  of South  Asia, the next most capital- 
scarce region in the world. 
Second, as the rest  of the world  has developed  manufactured  exports, 
it has developed constituencies  to defend the interests  of the sector. In 
most African countries  there is not yet a political constituency  for the 
deep changes needed to make manufactured  exports competitive. The 
macroeconomic  reforms  have been implemented  because they are po- 
litically easier than microeconomic  reforms. 
Finally, I worry  more  about  an implication  of the other  new economic 
geography, which emphasizes economies of agglomeration.  It is pos- 
17. Burnside  and Dollar (1997). 
18. Collier and Gunning  (1999). 
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sible that the prolonged phase of poor policies has caused Africa to 
miss its window of opportunity  to develop manufacturing:  the time 
when the cheap labor of Asia offset the agglomeration  economies of 
the developed world. By the time Africa reforms  its policies, the world 
may have enough manufacturing  sites for the long-term  share of man- 
ufactures in world demand, and given the advantages  of an existing 
agglomeration,  new entrants  will not be able to out-compete them. I 
hope not. I hope that  agglomeration  economies are sufficiently specific 
to market  niches that  Africa could quickly reach agglomeration  thresh- 
olds. But this is another  unresolved  empirical  question. 
Against these hysteresis effects, there are signs of hope. There are 
now comparable  studies for America, China, Mexico, Morocco, and 
four small African countries on whether  manufacturing  firms get pro- 
ductivity increases  through  exporting.20  For America, exporting  has no 
effect. For China, Mexico, and Morocco the results are mixed: there 
are  some effects, but they are  not large. For  Kenya, Zimbabwe,  Camer- 
oon, and Ghana  the effects are massive: new exporters  gain 13 percent 
relative to other firms in the year after breaking in,  and thereafter 
continued exporting raises productivity  by 9 percent per year. Once 
African firms get a toehold in the world market,  catch-up  can thus be 
rapid. 
Christopher Udry: Bloom and Sachs have provided an interesting, 
provocative, and ambitious paper. Their conclusion is unambiguous: 
"at the root of Africa's poverty  lies its extraordinarily  disadvantageous 
geography." They support  their argument  with a delightful mixture  of 
historical  discussion, botanical  and  medical argument,  and  statistics. If 
the reader  is not careful, he or she will be swept along. 
The paper is convincing because much of what it says is both im- 
portant  and true. Conditional  on current  agricultural  technology and 
existing institutions,  the geography  of Africa implies very low agricul- 
tural  productivity,  and hence terrible  poverty and poor growth. Much 
of what is special about demographic  patterns  in Africa can be under- 
stood as a consequence of low agricultural  productivity  and poverty, 
and high dependency  ratios and low life expectancy increase poverty 
and  provide  a further  substantial  drag  on growth  prospects. Geography 
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and demography,  then, are fundamental  components  of any account  of 
poverty  and  disappointing  growth  in Africa. Moreover,  they are  ignored 
in many discussions of Africa's "growth failure." 
The undeniable  importance  of the nexus of geography,  demography, 
technology, and institutions  for economic welfare in Africa does not, 
however, imply that geography lies at the root of poverty in Africa. 
Indeed, Bloom and Sachs do not want their paper to be "misunder- 
stood" as a new case of "geographic determinism." But the overall 
tone and strong statements  such as that quoted above make it virtually 
inevitable that this is precisely how most people will read it. 
Overstating  geography. When thinking about the puzzle of growth 
in Africa, I find it useful to keep in mind  the question  of Robert  Lucas: 
"Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?"' There are 
two categories of explanation:  first, bad technology, so that returns  to 
capital  are  low in Africa;  and  second, market  failures  that  inhibit  capital 
flows despite relatively high potential returns  to capital in some parts 
of Africa. 
Bloom and Sachs focus exclusively on the first, and  in particular,  on 
a set of geographic and demographic  factors that are associated with 
poverty, slow growth, and low returns  to capital. There is a temptation 
(which they resist admirably  in their conclusions but to which they 
succumb in the introduction)  to further  focus their rhetoric  on geog- 
raphy, despite their quantitative  evidence that  demographic  factors are 
far more important  determinants  of growth. The source of this tempta- 
tion is the authors' objective of uncovering "deep underlying  factors 
that have hindered African economic  growth .  .  . for the entire period 
of modern  economic growth." It is impossible to identify government 
policy, economic institutions, or even demographic  characteristics  of 
the population as such deep underlying  factors, because they are too 
clearly endogenous to the growth process. Geography  is the ultimate 
exogenous determinant  of the growth process-GDP  plays no role in 
plate tectonics. 
I have three main objections to the paper's emphasis on geography 
and demography as fundamental  impediments to growth in Africa. 
First, while it is clear  that  the geography  is exogenous, poor  agricultural 
productivity  is not a natural  outcome of Africa's geography. It is an 
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outcome of geographical facts in the context of a given agricultural 
technology in a challenging institutional  environment.  Therefore the 
effects of both geography  and demography  on growth are endogenous 
to the growth process itself. Second, there is abundant  evidence that 
bad technology and market  failures (both interpreted  broadly) are es- 
sential  elements  of any explanation  of Africa's growth  performance  that 
also answers the Lucas question regarding  capital flows. Finally, the 
quantitative  evidence on which the authors  in part  base their claims is 
extremely weak. 
The endogeneity  of  geography,  demography,  and public  health. 
Bloom and Sachs argue that causality runs from the tropics, a high 
youth dependency  ratio, and a high disease burden  to poverty  and slow 
growth in Africa. They provide an entirely convincing case that these 
factors have in fact had a pernicious  effect on economic growth  on the 
continent. Any sensible analysis of economic growth in Africa must 
incorporate  an understanding  of the effects of these physical and social 
factors. However, their contention that geography, demography,  and 
public health are largely exogenous to the growth process in Africa is 
much less persuasive. It is clear from a large literature  involving econ- 
omists, demographers,  and public health  researchers  that  demographic 
and public health patterns  in Africa are themselves largely determined 
by poverty and poor growth  prospects.2 
My claim that geography  is endogenous  to the pattern  of growth in 
Africa  is less obvious. Low and slowly growing agricultural  productiv- 
ity in Africa  is the consequence  of a complex  interaction  between  human 
activity and the environment,  rather  than  the simple outcome of disad- 
vantageous  geography.  The absence  of a significant  "green revolution" 
in Africa is only partly  a result of the facts that (overall) the continent 
is hot, has low and highly variable  rainfall, and has old, highly weath- 
ered, and fragile soils. This physical environment  combines with sys- 
temic failures of insurance  and capital markets  to produce extraordi- 
narily  complex farming  systems, finely designed to balance the needs 
to maintain  land fertility, to minimize risk, and to maximize profit.3 
Individual  farmers  produce  multiple  crops  (often intercropped)  on many 
scattered  plots, using managed  fallows of varying lengths to maintain 
2.  For  useful reviews of this literature,  see Strauss  and Thomas  (1995, 1998). 
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land productivity. There is no single principle to guide agricultural 
research:  increasing the yield of particular  crops is important,  but not 
at the costs of too large an increase in risk or adverse side effects on 
other crops planted  on the same plot. The success of a particular  inno- 
vation, therefore, is dependent  on not only particular  physical condi- 
tions but on the configuration  of factor markets  and social institutions 
that  address  problems  of risk and  the allocation  of capital. This implies 
that innovations are often quite localized, and also that there is  an 
enormous amount of indigenous agricultural  research.4  It has proven 
quite difficult to link this knowledge with the worldwide network of 
formal  agricultural  research  in the Consultative  Group  for International 
Agricultural  Research. 
Despite their occasional rhetoric  to the contrary,  Bloom and Sachs 
recognize that the demographic  and public health characteristics  that 
have impeded growth in Africa are mutable. They also recognize that 
while the physical facts of soil, sun, and rain are given, their effects 
on prospects  for agricultural  productivity  and technological  change are 
contingent  on institutions  and investment  in agricultural  research.  This 
is the import  of their well-written  and insightful conclusion: there is a 
"complex interplay among geography, demography,  health and eco- 
nomic performance." Bloom and Sachs err by setting some of these 
factors fundamentally  prior  to the others. 
This is an important  theoretical  point, but it also has strong impli- 
cations for policy. An easy misreading  of this paper  would lead one to 
the mistaken  conclusion that agriculture  in Africa is doomed by geog- 
raphy  to be unproductive,  and that it would be best to direct develop- 
ment  resources  away from  that  sector. In fact, there  are numerous  exam- 
ples of very successful, if small-scale, technological  change in African 
agriculture.  The common  characteristic  of these  success  stories  is that  they 
are  the product  of research  that  was sensitive  to both  the physical  features 
of the existing farming  system and the economic and institutional  envi- 
ronment.5  Bloom and Sachs  recognize  this potential,  and  it is vital not to 
overlook  their  conclusion  that  "the intensification  of scientific  research  on 
tropical agriculture in Africa .  . . is warranted." 
4.  Richards  (1985); Amanor  (1994). 
5.  For a discussion of improved  maize in semi-arid  West Africa, see Sanders,  Sha- 
piro, and Ramaswamy  (1996). On the explosive growth  of cocoa production  in Ghana, 
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Bad  technology  and market failure.  Bloom  and Sachs focus  exclu- 
sively on bad technology as an explanation  of poverty  and slow growth 
in Africa. The corollary of this is that investment  does not flow from 
capital-rich  nations  to capital-poor  Africa, because  the returns  to capital 
are low in Africa. In fact, real rates  of return  to investment  are exceed- 
ingly high in parts  of Africa. However, capital markets  are fragmented 
as a consequence of information  asymmetries  and imperfect enforce- 
ment mechanisms;  hence both international  and local capital flows are 
inhibited. 
Evidence on the returns  to capital  in Africa is fragmentary  and often 
difficult  to interpret.  Moreover,  what  is of interest  is the return  available 
in that part  of the economy for which standard  statistical  measures  are 
least likely to be available: enterprises  in the informal sector. Never- 
theless, some evidence is available. Arne Bigsten and others analyze 
panel data  on manufacturing  firms  in a number  of African  countries  and 
find extremely high returns  to investment  in certain  sectors.6 
Idiosyncratic but telling evidence is  available from equilibrium 
prices for used versus new goods, or small versus large quantities  of 
goods. Consider  the market  for automobile  parts  in an urban  setting. In 
Accra, Ghana,  for example, there  are active markets  for both new (high 
price but long lasting) and used (cheap but short-lived) replacement 
parts.  At one point in 1997, a used tire cost approximately  40,000 cedis 
and  could be expected to last for about  a year on a taxi in constant  use. 
A similar  new tire cost 90,000 cedis but would last three  to four years. 
With this pair of equilibrium  market prices, the real interest rate at 
which it is worthwhile to buy a sequence of used tires rather  than a 
single new tire is almost 40 percent per year.7 For the marginal  pur- 
chaser of tires in Accra, the opportunity  cost of capital is extremely 
high. The reason  why capital  is not flowing from my American  bank  to 
borrowers  in Accra is not that  there  are no profitable  investments  avail- 
able in Accra; it is that the informational  and enforcement  problems 
associated  with any such loan are so daunting. 
It is not only international  capital markets  that are fragmented.  At 
the same time that extremely high returns  are available for investment 
6.  Bigsten and  others  (1998). 
7.  This calculation  ignores both the expected cost of more frequent  punctures  with 
a series  of used  tires  and  the effects of risk  associated  with the uncertain  life expectancies 
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in some sectors, on the order of 90 percent of the nonhuman  assets 
owned by rural African households are held in the form of physical 
assets, such as grain stocks, animals, and consumer durables. These 
savers are prevented from capturing  the high potential returns  to in- 
vestment by the same types of problem of information  and contract 
enforcement  as interfere  with international  capital flows. As a conse- 
quence of these market  failures, profitable  investments are not made 
and growth remains  slow. 
The technological causes of poverty and slow growth in Africa de- 
scribed  by Bloom and Sachs are real. However, the exclusive focus on 
these factors is misleading. In many sectors the return  to capital is 
extremely  high; institutional  and  market  failures  make  it impossible for 
these returns  to be realized. 
Evidence. The authors'  simple cross-sectional  regressions  provide a 
weak quantitative  limb on which to base their  conclusions. My worries 
are familiar. First, Levine and David Renelt provide a valuable cau- 
tionary tale of the sensitivity of the results of such regressions to the 
fine details of model specification.8  Second, the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory  variable is a misspecification, 
because it is known that  there are persistent  unobserved  characteristics 
that influence growth over time (hence the error  term in the regression 
is correlated  with ln GDP per worker  in 1965). The coefficient of the 
lagged dependent  variable  is biased as a consequence  of this error,  and 
so are  the coefficients  of other  correlated  explanatory  variables.  Finally, 
the geographic and demographic  variables-with  the exception of the 
proportion  of land area in the tropics and the coastline variable-are 
themselves endogenous  and sure to be correlated  with the error  term  in 
the regression. The main demographic  variables  are life expectancy in 
1965 and a measure  of the relative growth  rates  of the working-age  and 
total populations  over 1965-90.  As noted above, these features  of the 
population  are chosen, not randomly  allocated by nature.  The popula- 
tion density near the coast is also endogenous, as this must largely 
reflect  patterns  of urbanization  and  regional  migration  that are strongly 
correlated  with the growth process. Consequently, readers  should use 
these statistical results with a great deal of caution; sweeping conclu- 
sions based on this evidence are not warranted. 
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General discussion: James Stock found the arguments  in the paper 
plausible, but the regression analysis less than convincing because of 
possible simultaneity  problems.  He questioned  inferring  causality  from 
regressions  of high inland  population  density-which  is correlated  with 
a large agricultural  sector-on  low GDP growth or of bad health on 
low GDP growth, as there are clear influences in both directions. He 
also cautioned  against  using lagged  dependent  variables  as a way around 
simultaneity, since the persistent nature  of Africa's problems would 
produce  high serial  correlation  in error  terms. David Laibson  suggested 
important  cultural  variables  that could be used in a growth  regression. 
He noted that hierarchical  religions were negatively correlated with 
public good provision and economic growth, so that Catholicism and 
Islam, brought by colonizers, may have affected Africa negatively. 
Legal systems inherited  from former  colonial powers also help to pre- 
dict economic outcomes, with the British system and its commercial 
code historically  having been the best at protecting  minority  rights. He 
concluded that the legacy of colonialism may be important  for under- 
standing Africa today, and statistical analysis could distinguish the 
impacts of the various colonial powers. 
William Dickens suggested a way to reconcile the paper's emphasis 
on geography with the complaints by Collier and Udry that it pays 
inadequate  attention to governmental  and economic institutions. He 
reasoned  that  the factors stressed  by Bloom and Sachs were more  basic 
than institutions. Important  institutions  such as capital markets  devel- 
oped in the areas  where trade  began to flourish.  So if geography  affects 
trade,  institutions  would follow geography.  Similarly, the rent-collect- 
ing aristocracy  that had hobbled all western economies vanished only 
after  the dynamism  of the capitalist  system gave it the political strength 
to replace  that aristocracy.  He suggested that if international  organiza- 
tions could promote desirable change in the political and economic 
institutions  of Africa, they could accelerate  the process  by which growth 
and institutional  change interact. 
Carol  Graham  proposed  investigating  directly whether  geographical 
disadvantages  are  associated  with slower  institutional  development.  She 
agreed  with the authors'  idea of moving away from policy-based lend- 
ing, but was more  cautious  about  giving priority  to the funding  of, say, 
malaria  research  rather  than  to building institutions  that would address 
problems  for which there  are already  remedies. She would give priority 288  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
to the prevention  of infectious disease and dealing with high rates of 
fertility and  female illiteracy. Graham  added  that  AIDS has contributed 
not only to the demographic  problems  in Africa  but  also to the weakness 
of its institutions, because it has decimated  the population  of talented 
civil servants. 
Robert  Gordon  argued  that  the overriding  importance  that  the authors 
attached  to geography  was not convincing and  was at odds with broader 
evidence. He recalled  David Landes's  analysis  that  the best agricultural 
conditions  in the world are on the west coast of Ireland,  yet Ireland  has 
lagged behind much of Europe  economically. He also noted that both 
geography and the initial conditions of colonization in Africa were 
similar to those in parts of Asia and Latin America. A cross-country 
comparison  among nations in these areas would help separate  the dis- 
tinctive role of unchanging  geography  from the role of things that do 
change, such as policies and institutions  in different  countries. Gordon 
also suggested that the return  to capital is low, or even negative, in 
Africa because of a high risk of theft and expropriation,  both of which 
clearly depend on the political system. 
Susan Collins welcomed the paper's attention  to geography, demo- 
graphy,  and  health, which are often neglected in studies  of growth. But 
she felt that  some standard  macroeconomic  variables  would sharpen  the 
explanation  of Africa's growth  and  better  inform  the debate  about  what 
steps might help. Because the particular  measure  of openness used in 
the paper is highly correlated  with other macroeconomic  policy varia- 
bles, she suspected that the openness variable  may capture  macroeco- 
nomic policies in general rather  than trade restrictions, and that its 
interpretation  was unclear. In particular, Collins suggested that the 
negative  coefficient  on openness  in the regression  presented  in the paper 
should not be interpreted  to mean that standard  measures  of macroeco- 
nomic and trade  policy did not matter  in these countries. 
Steven Radelet thought that the contribution  of the paper was to 
introduce geography into the analysis of growth, as Robert Hall and 
Chad  Jones had done in a preliminary  way in a previous  papaer,  rather 
than to argue for a clear distinction between policy and geography  or 
that one matters  more than the other. He agreed with Collier that one 
should not analyze Africa as if it were a single entity, and suggested 
distinguishing  among at least three  groups  of countries.  The first  group 
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the landlocked  countries  and could presumably  be successful in manu- 
facturing  exports. The second is the desert-type  economies that  are not 
going to develop successful agriculture,  and probably  not successful 
manufacturing  either; their prospects are a serious concern for which 
there seem to be no obvious policy solutions. The third group is the 
landlocked  economies  that  suffer  from  both  geographic  and  policy prob- 
lems and which may find it inherently  difficult  to compete in manufac- 
turing  products,  even if their labor  costs are very low. 290  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1998 
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